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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the importance of foreign assistance to U.S. national security.  The 
history of U.S. foreign assistance suggests that a lack of consistent objectives is one of 
the primary challenges facing effective U.S. aid operations.  Strategic aid planners can 
increase operational effectiveness by focusing on the following four planning 
considerations: (1) maintaining focus on recipient objectives, (2) stable funding, (3) 
making programs self-sustaining, and (4) minimizing dependency on U.S. appropriations 
or NGO donations.  This thesis evaluates these factors in the context of three higher 
education foreign assistance programs.   
The Ford Foundation’s International Fellowship Program offers an example of an 
international nonreligious NGO.  The USAID-Higher Education for Development 
Training, Internships, Exchanges and Scholarships partnership in Mexico provides an 
example of a bilateral foreign assistance program.  The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints Perpetual Education Fund offers an illustration of the humanitarian operations 
of an international religious organization.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis addresses the importance of foreign assistance to U.S. national 
security.  The history of U.S. foreign assistance suggests that a lack of consistent 
objectives is one of the primary challenges facing effective U.S. aid operations.  Strategic 
aid planners can increase operational effectiveness by focusing on the following four 
planning considerations: (1) maintaining focus on recipient objectives, (2) stable funding, 
(3) making programs self-sustaining, and (4) minimizing dependency on U.S. 
appropriations or NGO donations.  This paper evaluates these factors in the context of 
three higher education foreign assistance programs.   
The attacks on 11 September 2001 thrust economic development into the 
forefront of national security politics.  Development advocates recommended large 
increases to foreign aid budgets under the premise that such “soft power” would 
strengthen America’s security relationships in the developing world while reducing 
poverty.1  Since 2002, U.S. National Security Strategies have highlighted foreign 
assistance as a policy tool to advance economic and security objectives in developing 
countries.  Following military engagements in Iraq, some called on the United States to 
shift from “exporting fear” to “inspiring optimism and hope” through a modern 
development agenda.2  In May 2010, the President made it clear that the United States is 




                                                 
1 Lael Brainard, “A Unified Framework for U.S. Foreign Assistance,” in Security by Other Means : 
Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, and American Leadership, ed. Lael Brainard (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 5. 
2 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The Future of Soft Power in US Foreign Policy,” in Soft Power and U.S. Foreign 
Policy; Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox 
(Abingdon, OH: Routledge Press, 2010), 9. 
3 White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” (Washington, D.C.: 
White House, 2010), 33. 
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In November 2010, Republicans won control of the U.S. House of 
Representatives largely on an agenda to curb federal spending.  The next likely House  
Foreign Affairs committee chairperson, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, has called 
President Obama’s foreign assistance budget “ambitious in its magnitude.”4      
The debate over aid effectiveness will continue to play a significant role in the 
discussions of national security objectives.  Although the debate is not new, the United 
States has committed itself to be more effective in the use of foreign assistance funding to 
“chang[e] the conversation on how best to deliver smart U.S. foreign assistance.”5 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The debate over foreign aid is complex and at times confusing.  There is an 
overwhelming amount of data and even more opinions on what it is, and how, where, 
when or even if it should be used. 
A survey by Perkins et al. narrows the debate into three general perspectives on 
foreign development aid.  The first group argues that aid positively impacts developing 
countries; the second argues the opposite and charges that it does little good and can 
create significant unintended consequences; the third is a more moderate argument 
claiming that it can work in the right environment.6 
1. Arguments for Foreign Assistance 
Jeffery Sachs is one of the top cheerleaders for foreign developmental assistance 
and has led international efforts to implement the UN Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG).  Those following this agenda desire a stronger aid commitment and focus on the  
 
 
                                                 
4 Charley Keyes, Laurie Ure, and Pam Benson, “Shift to GOP control in House Signals Shift in 
Foreign Policy Matters,” CNN Politics.com, November 3, 2010, 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/11/03/gop. house.shift/index.html?hpt=T2 (accessed 11/4/2010). 
5 Millennium Challenge Corporation, “MCC: About MCC,”  
http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/about/index.shtml (accessed 6/11/2010). 
6 Dwight H. Perkins, Steven Radelet, and David L. Lindauer, eds., Economics of Development, 6th ed. 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 538–54. 
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fact that the United States provides aid amounting to 0.2 percent of its Gross National  
Income (GNI) toward Overseas Developmental Aid (ODA).7  Since this is well short of 
the 1970 commitment they argue that OECD countries still owe more than $4 trillion to 
ODA.8   
As evidence of aid effectiveness, they point to the Green revolution, the 
elimination of small pox, successful vaccination programs and other successful 
initiatives.9  For them the fight against poverty and underdevelopment is a war that needs 
to be won through an immediate “big push” of foreign assistance.10  Others argue that 
foreign assistance can play a crucial role in the democratization process by helping to 
strengthen government institutions.11   
2. Arguments Against Foreign Assistance  
On the opposing side, economists like William Easterly question the effectiveness 
of foreign aid.  They highlight constant calls for “emergency” aid from popular media 
stars and point out that similar calls go back to the 1940s and that such efforts have not 
historically met expectations.  This group attacks the “big push” model as ineffective in 
providing an economy with the cross-sector investment necessary to raise incomes and 
savings.  Bauer argues that foreign donors improperly allocate resources to projects that 
                                                 
7 Data is within ‘Tables and Charts’ link found at Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, “Development Aid Rose in 2009 and Most Donors Will Meet 2010 Aid Targets,”  
http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3343,en_2649_34487_44981579_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 
6/11/2010).  
8 Anup Shah, “Official Global Foreign Aid Shortfall: $4 Trillion” 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/593/official-global-foreign-aid-shortfall-over-4-trillion (accessed 
6/10/2010). 
9 Al Huebner, “Ending World Poverty is Achievable,” The Humanist 66, no. 1 (2006): 44; Douglas A. 
Hicks, “The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time,” Cross Currents 56, no. 1 (2006): 139; 
Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for our Time (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).  
10 Paul Collier, “African Growth: Why a ‘Big Push’?” Journal of African Economies 15, no. S2 
(2006): 188.  
11 Aníbal Pérez-Lińán Finkel Steven E and A. Seligson Mitchell, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign 
Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003,” World Politics 59, no. April (2007): 405; Ted Dagne, 
“Africa: US Foreign Assistance Issues,” RL33591 (July 28, 2006) (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, 2006), 8; Curt Tarnoff and Marian L. Lawson, “Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. 
Programs and Policy,” RL40213 (April 9, 2009) (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
2009), 6. 
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undermine individual incentives.12  Well-meaning donors ask “what can ‘we’ do?”  The 
policy outcomes of such a question lead to supply-driven answers reflected in 
condescending attitudes and ineffective aid delivery that are not always in alignment with 
demand-driven requirements in recipient countries.  Aid opponents also highlight that 
although nearly $3 trillion has been spent on foreign assistance many of the same issues 
remain.13  
Those arguing against aid claim that aid not only does not work, but it creates 
dependency, which de-incentivizes recipients from actively participating in 
entrepreneurial initiatives required in a free market.  Moyo argues that aid in Africa has 
suppressed its potential by increasing corruption, preventing the development of an 
entrepreneurially minded middle class, provoking civil war, reducing savings and 
investment, creating inflation, and suppressing export industries.14   
Another claim from this corner is that foreign assistance serves to create 
competition for funds between countries and discourages coordination among aid 
agencies.  Countries with the greatest need are often left on the outside.  Those prepared 
to spend or borrow the largest amounts of aid often “win” because aid institutions are 
incentivized by how much they are able to spend.15  Further, conditions aimed at 
improving accountability are often ineffective because recipient governments have the 
option to deal with “politically neutral” donors like China.16   
 
 
                                                 
12 William Easterly, “Can the West Save Africa?” Journal of Economic Literature 47, no. 2 (2009): 
373; Andrei Shleifer, “Peter Bauer and the Failure of Foreign Aid,” Cato Journal 29, no. 3 (2009): 379.   
13 Shah, “Official Global Foreign Aid Shortfall: $4 Trillion.”  
14 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa, 1st 
ed. (New York, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 48–68.  
15 Shleifer, “Peter Bauer and the Failure of Foreign Aid,” 379. 
16 Ravi Kanbur, “Aid, Conditionality and Debt in Africa,” in Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons 
Learnt and Directions for the Future, ed. Finn Tarp (London: Routledge, 2000), 414–15; Fareed Zakaria, 
The Post-American World (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008), 117.  
 5
Djankov argues that governments relying on high levels of aid are similar to those 
with the “curse of natural resources” or “Dutch disease.”  Government control of a 
valuable resource is often used to preserve power.  When foreign assistance revenues are  
received, there is no accountability to citizens who in turn do not insist on representation 
because they do not feel they own the government—the population becomes increasingly 
dependent upon the government.17   
Agencies that rely on donor taxpayers have been compared to “rainmakers” who 
take credit for successes, but place blame on others when goals are not met.  Aid 
organizations have been criticized for using inexperienced or unethical employees whose 
primary objective is to spend allocated resources instead of serving true community 
needs.  Misapplied efforts, such as food aid sent to countries with a stable and 
functioning agricultural sector, can destroy private entrepreneurial incentives to grow and 
sell selected crops.  Perceived colonial arrogance and racism are other charges that have 
been thrown at agencies. 18 
3. Argument for a Moderate Approach 
Although the literature is often contentious, both sides have good intentions and 
typically appeal to case studies to illustrate the strength of their perspective.  Although 
Collier joins Sachs in his desires for a “big push,” he acknowledges that aid has 
limitations that need to be addressed internally.  Easterly acknowledges the success of 





                                                 
17 Jose G. Montalvo Djankov Simeon and Reynal-Querol Marta, “Does Foreign Aid Help,” Cato 
Journal 26, no. 1 (2006): 2, 7 and 11; Dirk J. Vandewalle, The Distributive State (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), 219.  
18 Graham Hancock, Lords of Poverty : the Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the International Aid 
Business, 1st ed. (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989), 11–22. 
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failure of efforts to resolve the problem of AIDS.19  At the same time, most aid 
organization’s annual reports paint a rosy picture that would lead one to believe that there 
are very few challenges in aid delivery.20  
Sundberg and Gelb question the past use of aid, but stress that “more and better 
aid is now going to finance development programs.”21  Theoretically, this aid would 
focus on building democratic institutional capacity.  Burnside and Dollar evaluated 56 
countries and came to the conclusion that aid is “generally ineffective”; they then 
evaluated the same countries according to policy typology and found that countries 
promoting budgetary discipline, inflation control and open trade generally experienced 
economic growth.22  Despite criticism of these findings, this research has provided the 
model for aid allocation for many agencies, including the World Bank and the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). 
4. The Private Sector: Micro-Finance and Higher Education 
All sides agree the private sector is a vital component for economic development.  
Most successful economic environments have a solid balance of institutional capacity and 
private sector production.  The primary disagreement between the two sides is how to 
empower private sector capacity. 
“Development from below” initiatives, such as micro-credit, appear to be an 
attractive option for stimulating private sector entrepreneurial activity, especially in post-
conflict areas with large informal economies.  Both Sachs and Easterly highlight the 
success of Yunus Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.  While Sachs sells it as a success of aid, 
                                                 
19 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So 
Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin Group, 2006), 241.  
20 M. G. Quibria, “Rethinking Development Effectiveness: Facts, issues and policies,” World 
Economics 6, no. 1 (2005): 103.  
21 Mark Sundberg and Alan Gelb, “Making Aid Work,” Finance & Development 43, no. 4 (2006): 14.  
22 Quibria, “Rethinking Development Effectiveness: Facts, issues and policies,” 103–04; Craig 
Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth: Reply,” The American Economic Review 94, no. 3 
(2004): 781.  
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Easterly sees it as entrepreneurial creativity meeting a need for affordable credit.23  In the 
end, both sides recognize the need for entrepreneurs in development.  
Higher education is another form of foreign assistance that can improve the 
private sector and any move toward free markets.  The majority of the literature on 
foreign educational assistance focuses on primary education.  As an example, MDG  
number two aims to increase primary education in developing nations.  As a result, many 
nations report significant improvements, thereby increasing demand for higher levels of 
education.24 
Higher education is widely viewed as a means to add value to human capital and 
tends to increase productivity.  Earnings tend to rise according to the level of education 
received, thereby enhancing the private sector.25  Some studies claim that more than  
30 percent of U.S. per capita income between 1930 and 1960 resulted from investments 
in higher education.26  During the last decade, Chinese and Indian investments in 
university and technical training are said to be largely responsible for the vast 





                                                 
23 Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill 
and So Little Good, 58–59; Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for our Time, 10–14.  
24 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Financing Higher Education in Africa,” 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2010), 16; United Nations, “UN Millennium Development Goals,”  
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/education.shtml (accessed 6/11/2010).  
25 Perkins, Radelet, and Lindauer, eds., Economics of Development, 285.  
26 John Aubrey Douglass, “The Race for Human Capital,” in Globalization’s Muse: Universities and 
Higher Education Systems in a Changing World, ed. John Aubrey Douglass, C. Judson King, and Irwin 
Feller (Berkeley: Public Policy Press/Center for Studies in Higher Education: Institute of Governmental 
Studies, 2009), 46.  
27 Douglass, “The Race for Human Capital,” 45. 
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Although it is widely assumed that higher education is an important component in 
improving human capital, developing countries face some challenges.  Assessing 
opportunity costs, providing adequate access to education and avoiding the “brain drain” 
are among the primary concerns facing developing countries.28  Additionally, building 
educational capacity without strong demand for employment can result in high levels of 
disenfranchised youth and associated security concerns.29  There is evidence that as 
economies shrink, in some environments, highly educated young people can pose 
terrorism challenges.30  To conclude, however, that countries should avoid higher 
education due to the risk of unemployment would be unwise.  The challenge is to 
simultaneously improve governance and build institutions that promote entrepreneurship 
and investment.  In the absence of education and institution building programs, poverty 
poses a broader challenge.31 Despite these concerns, as demand for higher education 
increases so will demand for scholarships, grants and student loans.   
Given the mixed results and continued debate on aid effectiveness, the most likely 
outcome is a continued lack of consistent objectives, policies, and resources to foreign 
assistance programs.  There is an abundance of research on foreign assistance that offer a 
diversity of opinions on key variables related to the impact of education on economic 
development and conflict.  Focusing on education, strategic aid planners may benefit 
from a closer examination of three higher education foreign assistance programs that 
offer scholarships, grants or loans as a means to assist target populations.  By developing 
an understanding of the variables that affect program consistency, strategic aid planners 
may be able to recommend principles and approaches that minimize fluctuations in 
program execution.  
                                                 
28 Devesh Kapur and Megan Crowley, Beyond the ABCs: Higher Education and Developing 
Countries (Center for Global Development, 2008), 44–52.  
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of Zambai’s University Graduates” (Master’s thesis, Dalhousie University (Canada), 2008), abstract.  
30 Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence,” International 
Studies Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2006): 608. 
31 Douglass, “The Race for Human Capital,” 47.  
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B. HYPOTHESES AND METHODS  
This thesis addresses the importance of foreign assistance to U.S. national 
security.  A lack of consistent objectives is one of the primary challenges facing effective 
U.S. aid operations.  Strategic assistance planners can increase operational effectiveness 
by focusing on the following four planning considerations: (1) maintaining focus on 
recipient objectives, (2) stable funding, (3) making programs self-sustaining, and (4) 
minimizing dependency on U.S. appropriations or NGO donations.  This paper evaluates 
these factors in the context of three higher education foreign assistance programs.   
This will be a qualitative comparative case study looking at the sustainability of 
three foreign assistance higher education programs.  The following assumptions are 
important for this research:   
 Free markets are important to global stability and security. 
 Entrepreneurs/private sector jobs play a central role in free market 
development and serve as the primary source of tax revenues to support a 
democracy. 
 Higher education aimed at private sector improvement is an investment in 
free markets and global stability. 
 Dependency is not a desired condition.  It occurs when recipient nations 
rely exclusively on donor countries to support programs.  If a donor nation 
loses funding capacity, the recipient nation loses the ability to provide lost 
service and the donor nation loses any political influence. 
Each of the three cases examined provides scholarships, loans or grants to 
individuals or institutions in developing countries.  A variety of institutional perspectives 
have been selected.  The Ford Foundation’s International Fellowship Program32 is a 
socially oriented nonreligious NGO, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
Perpetual Education Fund is a religious institution and USAIDs Higher Education for 
                                                 
32 “Ford Foundation International Fellowship Program Home Page,” International Fellowship Fund, 
http://www.fordifp.org/ (accessed 12/2/2010).   
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Development Training, Internships, Exchanges and Scholarships initiative is a U.S. 
government institution.  These were chosen as programs with sufficient history and data 
for evaluation.  Additionally, they represent international development institutions with 
different purposes, perspectives and operational structures. 
The qualitative analysis will consist of three general parts.  First, it will be 
necessary to evaluate the overarching purpose and associated organizational structure of 
each institution.  Second, the four planning considerations required to maintain program 
consistency for recipients will be examined.  These include evaluating whether the 
program is focused on recipient objectives, has stable funding, is self-sustaining through 
private sector involvement, and eventually moves away from possible dependency on 
U.S. appropriations or external donations.  Third, each case will be examined in light of 
broader U.S. policy implications.  This will reveal possible areas to “expand our 
investment in effective multilateral institutions” and ways to “leverage the engagement of 
others to share the burden.”33 
                                                 
33 White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” 
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II. HISTORY: FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of foreign economic assistance is relatively simple.  It is essentially a 
resource transfer from a donor nation to a recipient nation.  How did such a simple 
concept become such a widely debated and politically loaded topic?  How did the United 
States come to interpret foreign assistance as a tool to “provide for the common defense 
. . . to ourselves and our posterity?”34   
The primary challenge facing foreign assistance is the lack of consistent 
objectives, conflicting policies, and the subsequent inefficient allocation of resources.  
This chapter provides historical examples of how American foreign aid policy has 
attempted to align security, economic, and humanitarian objectives.35  Aid programs are 
often marketed in humanitarian terms, while political support is won on security and 
economic terms.  This sets the stage for conflicting definitions of success.  
Success is defined by one’s perspective.  The U.S. generally views success 
through its security or economic interests while recipients define it through a 
humanitarian lens.  Aligning U.S. objectives and recipient economic development goals 
is based on the assumption that development aid leads to prosperity and provides a 
foundation for strong economic relationships and alliances.  Relationships and alliances 
imply trust-based partnerships.  In this sense, the humanitarian objective is the common 
objective required to build trust, and therefore should remain the primary focus for both 
donor and recipient.   
If the lack of consistent objectives, policies and resources is the biggest obstacle 
                                                 
34 U. S. Constitution, “Preamble.” 
35 Each of these terms at its core has a security purpose.  The humanitarian objective implies actions 
designed to serve the recipients immediate needs.  The security implication is that these actions serve to 
build stronger relationships of trust.  It would be a tool that adds to U.S. soft power, although Nye would 
argue that it is not soft power because it seeks to provide incentives for a specific behavior. Inderjeet 
Parmar and Michael Cox, “Introduction,” in Soft Power and U.S. Foreign Policy; Theoretical, Historical 
and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox (Abingdon, OH: Routledge Press, 
2010), 1.   
 12
facing foreign assistance success, then it is important to examine (1) why U.S. foreign 
assistance was created (2) the desired end state (3) how programs were structured and (4) 
which organizations could best execute the policy.  
Constitutional accountability becomes the foundation for structure.  The 
Constitution serves as a contract between American citizens and the elected officials who 
create foreign policy.  This is the driving factor in tying foreign assistance to security or 
domestic objectives.  Since recipients do not have a direct voice in the accountability 
process, the system relies on the mood and circumstances of Americans.  This “principal-
agent” problem complicates foreign assistance because taxpayers are not the direct 
beneficiaries of the appropriation.36 
Foreign aid has been a multi-billion dollar tool for U.S. foreign policy since 1948.  
During that time there have been twelve different Presidents, thirty-two Congresses, four 
major wars, a bipolar Cold War followed by multipolar globalization, natural disasters, 
debt and humanitarian crises on top of numerous other issues competing for attention and 
resources.   
B. U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BEFORE WWII 
Other than what appears to have been a one-time appropriation to assist 
Venezuelan earthquake victims in 1812, the United States did most of its early foreign 
charity work through private organizations.  Occasionally, naval vessels were used to 
deliver aid or to provide relief in emergency situations, but no long-term commitments 
were made.37   
World War I changed the aid landscape as the magnitude of human disaster 
prompted several American agencies to become involved in aid delivery.  Herbert 
Hoover was propelled into the political arena after he “splendidly” managed an agency  
 
                                                 
36 Steven Radelet, “A Primer on Foreign Aid-Working Paper 92,” Center for Global Development, 
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/8846 (accessed 9/17/2010), 12.   
37 Encyclopedia of the New American Nation, “Early History of American Foreign Relief–
Humanitarian Intervention and Relief,”  http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Humanitarian-
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that provided $1 billion in relief for war victims.  He later helped convince Congress to 
appropriate $100 million to feed and clothe 200 million Europeans.38 
After WWI anti-communist ideologies in the United States grew as the 
Bolsheviks took over Russian leadership.  Initially, Hoover allowed political ideologies 
to influence where aid would be delivered.  For example, as the presidentially appointed 
Food Administrator, he withheld food from Hungarian communist revolutionaries to 
encourage them to avoid Bolshevism.  Later however, when Russia faced certain famine, 
he put aside political ideology for humanitarian concern and convinced Congress to 
provide aid-- Russia later credited Hoover with saving millions of Russian lives.39 
In its earliest stages, American foreign aid preserved this strong humanitarian 
flavor.  The post WWI American Relief Association was created to coordinate a specific 
humanitarian mission with a definable exit strategy.  Although the timetable missed its 
mark, Hoover began to phase out American efforts and transition capacity to host 
nations.40  By World War II, Americans had developed a strong humanitarian reputation 
for the private support many people gave to various causes throughout the world.41 
C.  TRUMAN-THE INITIAL VISION AND CONSTRUCT 
Following World War II, the Truman administration was in search of a new 
foreign policy.  The dynamics of international politics had changed--new security and 
economic strategies were required in the midst of another humanitarian disaster.  Damage 
from World War II, the communist threat, and nuclear weapons changed the security 
environment.   
                                                 
38 Spencer Tucker and Priscilla Mary Roberts, World War I : A Student Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, 
Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2006), 886.  
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Europe was destroyed during WWII.  Britain and France had survived, but they 
were struggling to provide basic necessities to their populations.  Imperial governance 
was coming to an end, and the United States took its place as the world leader of 
democracy and capitalism. 
American leaders who visited Europe in the immediate months following the end 
of the war witnessed unparalleled devastation.  Millions had died, and throughout 
Europe, starvation and hopelessness plagued those who had survived.  Many of these 
leaders personally remembered Europe’s struggles after World War I and the vows that it 
would never happen again.  The aftermath of WWII made it clear that those convictions 
had failed.   
The immediate end to the war in Europe saw a surge in hope and reconstruction 
efforts.  In 1946, President Hoover was called upon to lead a short-term Famine 
Emergency Commission aimed at thwarting the post-war starvation threatening Europe 
and Asia.42  Throughout that year extensive structural damage and a harsh winter 
inhibited European agricultural capacity.  It became clear that the available effort and 
capital was far short of survival needs.43 
In terms of the security environment, nuclear weapons changed everything.  
Nuclear power changed the risks associated with warfare and caused U.S. leaders to 
pursue policies they may have avoided otherwise.  While the United States began as the 
lone nuclear power, it was widely assumed that the Soviet Union and others would 
acquire nuclear capability—the only question was when.  The war against Germany had 
forced an unlikely East-West alliance between the United States, France, Great Britain 
and the Soviet Union, but following the war differences were quickly exposed as they 
sought ways to collectively govern Germany and rebuild Europe.     
While the fear of communism began in 1917 during the Russian revolution, many 
Americans hoped that past differences could be resolved.  Unfortunately, philosophical 
                                                 
42 Robert J. Donovan, The Second Victory: The Marshall Plan and the Postwar Revival of Europe 
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disagreements prevented a unified plan over German and Central European governance.  
The Soviet Union seemed to have no intention of giving up military gains in Poland and 
Eastern Europe.44  Following the Potsdam and Moscow conferences, Truman and Army 
Chief of Staff Marshall felt that Stalin desired a weak German economy to enable the 
spread of communism.45 
As distrust grew, U.S. fears of communist expansion became stronger.  Bloody 
conflicts in China, Greece, Iran and other places confirmed these feelings and nobody 
knew where the communist expansion might end.  In the eyes of the United States, such 
expansion threatened national security.  When Britain notified the United States in 
February 1947 that it no longer could support Greece or Turkey in efforts to fight off 
communists, the United States felt a sense of urgency to act.  By March, President 
Truman declared that it was the obligation of the United States “to support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.”46  
Dean Acheson provided additional insight on U.S. policy by highlighting that the United 
States would focus its relief efforts on “areas where it would be most effective in building 
world political and economic stability, in promoting human freedom and democratic 
institutions” through the United Nations.47  
Finally, while speaking at Harvard University, Secretary Marshall addressed the 
humanitarian problem without overtly highlighting national security concerns.  
Recognizing America’s isolationist past and believing in Acheson’s multilateral approach 
he sold the plan as a friend assisting an able neighbor during difficult times.  The world 
seemed to be falling apart and the United States was the only country with the capacity to 
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take a stand and ask the American people to help.  He concluded with “the whole world’s 
future hangs on a proper judgment, hangs on a realization by the American people of 
what can best be done, of what must be done.”48   
While the speech did not directly address the communist threat, the underlying 
security motive was present and an important part of the legislative debate.  Opposition to 
the bill ranged from right-leaning isolationist concerns to left-leaning imperialist 
concerns.  In the end, the February 1948 communist overthrow of Czechoslovakia made 
passage of the European Recovery Program (ERP) unstoppable.49 
1. Desired End State and Initial Structure 
The Marshall Plan established the pattern of marketing foreign assistance toward 
humanitarian objectives while aligning them with security objectives.  This is not to 
imply that humanitarian concerns were superficial.  The United States truly saw a 
humanitarian crisis and deduced that such a crisis could leave Europe vulnerable to an 
ideological shift, which could harm the American way of life.  In the end, it was the 
security motive that provided the momentum for action, but the program was structured 
to address the humanitarian objective of reconstruction.    
The ERP was designed as a short-term attempt to stimulate production, invite 
private investment and unify Western European economies.50  At its core was the 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which was led by an Administrator with a 
similar role as one of the President’s Cabinet Secretaries.  The Committee of European 
Economic Cooperation (CEEC) was established to give recipient countries a voice 
through the U.S. Special Representative Abroad.  The Public Advisory Board provided 
private sector experts, while a Joint Congressional Committee was established to provide 
regular oversight and Congressional interaction.51   
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Secretary Marshall claimed that the ECA was to focus on operational issues while 
the State Department would handle foreign policy.  The challenge was defining those 
lines.52  Republicans won efforts to appoint someone from the private sector as 
Administrator.  This, along with direct accountability to the President, alleviated concerns 
that the ECA would be an extension of the State Department and would shift away from 
its humanitarian objectives.53   
Paul Hoffman, during his nomination hearings for administrator’ said he saw his 
job as staying focused on increasing European production, which would serve 
humanitarian and economic needs.54  While the administration and Congress attempted to 
combine goodwill with national security and domestic interests, there were challenges.   
The ECA was tasked to balance Europe’s production without hurting American 
business interests.  Shipping and agricultural special interests won some special 
protection, but overall the legislation enabled the ECA to meet its objective of European 
production.   
Perhaps due to its unique mission and the level of Congressional oversight, the 
ECA did an admirable job of serving European and American interests.  For example, 
when the United States was facing recession in 1949, President Truman directed federal 
agencies to buy goods and services in high unemployment areas as much as possible.  
The ECA responded by pointing countries to these markets as possible sources for 
cheaper prices and better service, but avoided pressure toward poor business deals.  
Essentially, the ECA served as European advocates by looking for the best deals possible 
but emphasized American products when they seemed to be bargains.  Due in part to such 
efforts, the ERP has been credited with aiding the United States during its 1949 economic 
downturn.55 
The CEEC was created to provide Western Europe coordinated inputs into the 
                                                 
52  Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–
1952, 105.  
53 Donovan, The Second Victory: The Marshall Plan and the Postwar Revival of Europe, 48.  
54 Immanuel Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 57. 
55 Ibid., 76–77.  
 18
foreign aid process.  It also played into the security strategy by nudging Europe toward 
greater collective cooperation and away from the nationalism of the past.56  ERP 
administrators sent an early message when they rejected the first round of economic 
proposals because they sought to meet individual needs.  As participating countries began 
to increase their levels of cooperation, the program moved toward its security goals.57  
The CEEC eventually became the OECD, and over time, became one of the first 
European institutions that helped build the foundation for the future European Union. 
The ERP was destined to confront situations where security trumped the 
humanitarian objective.  One such instance came when Congress passed legislation to 
encourage Western Europe to adopt export controls against Eastern Europe.  This was 
designed to prevent Europe from providing goods to the Soviet Union or its communist 
allies.58  By establishing economic conditions for continued assistance, the United States 
drew its European allies further within its scope of influence. 
Some claim that the ERP did not cause Europe’s economic recovery.  While this 
may be true, its most important success was its psychological impact.  Recovery 
accelerated as Europeans saw their countries being infused with capital and the 
humanitarian injections provided from the Marshall Plan.  Although people had been 
working toward reconstruction, the plan provided basic necessities, hope and a positive 
impression of the United States.59  
The Marshall Plan has been overwhelmingly popular.  Although some criticize it 
today, it played a vital role in European postwar recovery and especially provided hope 
when it was needed.  Economic recovery and the fact that many of the recipient countries 
evolved on to become donor nations, are two accomplishments associated with its efforts.  
Perhaps one of the greatest weaknesses of the Marshall Plan was its perceived success.  
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The program was designed to assist Europe in its short-term recovery then phase out.  
While the program in Europe did end, it has been a rallying point to justify billions of 
dollars spent on foreign assistance throughout the world.  Other programs have not been 
as well received and, in some cases, are credited with causing more harm than good to 
developing nations.60  
From an economic perspective, the Marshall Plan was credited with increasing 
trade relationships with European countries and also established an income stream for 
many industries, especially agriculture and shipping.  While that income increased local 
employment and production, it also stymied true competition and the subsequent lower 
costs created from true free market competition.  By providing domestic incentives, 
special interest groups were formed to lobby government to protect these benefits.  Over 
time, the affected industries became dependent on the government as a source of income. 
In a security sense, the plan did help shift Europe toward collective security.  
While it served to reassure European allies, it also increased the competition with the 
Soviet Union and set the precedence for using aid in national security efforts.61 
President Truman revealed the “Point Four” program during his 1949 inaugural 
speech. This further expanded aid’s role as an influence strategy as it shifted development 
efforts toward nonEuropean countries and sought to encourage democracy in countries 
vulnerable to Soviet influence.  Although not part of the Marshall Plan, President Truman 
sought to establish an affordable yet “bold” international assistance program.  Many 
leaders in developing countries, however, interpreted it as a Marshall Plan on an 
international scale despite Truman’s caution that it would be accomplished with very 
minimal resources.62 
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Point Four was set in motion through the 1950 Act for International Development 
and Foreign Economic Assistance Act.  In these bills the Technical Cooperation 
Administration (TCA) was created under the Department of State to "provide scientific 
and technical assistance and encourage political stability along with economic and social 
success.”63   
The TCA aimed to accomplish its humanitarian mission with a “people to people” 
training approach as opposed to a large inflow of American capital.  The premise of this 
approach was that the “power of education and the promise of technology” were the keys 
to true economic development.64  In light of the immediate national security challenges 
and a shift toward deterrence, the State Department pushed for a greater capital influx.  
Although Truman pushed back, the momentum toward a broader deterrent strategy and 
the Korean War was too great.65   
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 broadened and transferred the ECA into the 
newly created Mutual Security Agency (MSA).  This was the first attempt to fit longer 
term development objectives under the larger deterrent strategy.  By placing the ECA 
under the auspices of the MSA, many long-term development objectives would compete 
with short-term security efforts.  For example, most technical assistance initiatives were 
approved by the ECA, but initiatives in strategically important areas, required higher 
levels of approval.66 
NGOs were valuable to the Point Four concept.  As the government examined 
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Religious organizations, private foundations and universities were well equipped with 
money, knowledge, experience, people and desire.67 
Religious organizations were vital, but they also proved to be a tremendous 
challenge.  In 1950, religious funding toward technical assistance programs was more 
than double government funding.  Religious groups supported the Point Four concept, but 
they did not want the government to dictate their activities.  At the same time, the 
government wanted to avoid the appearance of state sanctioned proselytization.  The best 
compromise seemed to be government grants for organizations to do their work.  
Religious groups viewed the merger of foreign assistance under the MSA as a 
shift away from the original humanitarian intentions.  As Cold War realities pushed 
foreign assistance closer to more obvious security roles, several religious groups shifted 
their support and called for a return to original policies.68 
D. PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND “MASSIVE RETALIATION” 
General Eisenhower’s military performance during WWII won him the 
opportunity to serve as Commander in Chief.  While maintaining the overall policy of 
containment, his preferred deterrence strategy was “massive retaliation.”  The premise of 
this strategy was that containing communism wherever there was a threat was expensive 
and it put the United States in a continually defensive state of mind.  Instead, Eisenhower 
claimed his administration would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in the event that 
vital American or allied interests were attacked.  This led to increased competition with 
the Soviet Union, an expensive arms race, and a growing fear that nuclear war was 
imminent.69 
In his inaugural address, Eisenhower argued that economic development was a 
matter of security—“the impoverishment of any single people in the world means danger 
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to the well-being of all other peoples.”70  As a Republican, he believed that poverty 
should be confronted through a strong private sector.  As a consequence, the foreign 
assistance budget dropped from $7.6 billion in 1953 to $3.5 billion in 1955.  After the 
Soviets promised economic assistance to India in 1955, U.S. policymakers pressed for an 
increase in publicly provided aid.  By 1956, Congress reported that “foreign aid appears 
to be the most useful nonmilitary device available to the United States for influencing 
other nations.” 71   
As debate continued over how foreign assistance could best accomplish its role in 
national security, President Eisenhower created the Foreign Operations Administration to 
further consolidate aid programs.  In 1955, the State Department captured many foreign 
assistance programs with the creation the International Cooperation Administration 
(ICA).  While the steps were important for bringing aid under a larger security umbrella, 
they did little to encourage humanitarian efforts.  
This restructuring led to disagreements over the direction of aid.  Not only did 
humanitarian objectives compete with security objectives, but economic self-interest 
grew as a motive for foreign development.  For example, the United States shipping 
lobby successfully pressured the ICA to ship all aid via American ships.  These subsidies 
provided short-term advantages, but by 1961, politicians were looking to wean the 
industry off its aid addiction.72   
The 1950s illustrate how U.S. security objectives can take precedence over 
humanitarian objectives.  As the Cold War became more intense and competitive, the 
ability to patiently await humanitarian outcomes became unrealistic in the midst of more  
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immediately pressing security concerns.  Instead of focusing on the development needs of 
the time, foreign aid became a tool to win allies and influence.   
Incentives can serve as a means to solve problems or create additional ones.  
Countries or interest groups have marketed problems in the context of available 
incentives.  For example, as the United States shifted its focus toward security objectives, 
many poorer countries have advertised their problems in security terms.  Domestic 
interest groups have marketed strong employment as critical to national security while 
NGOs that might have lost access to funds in a security focused environment have 
decried the lack of focus on humanitarian needs.  Whatever the truth was, the money 
available through foreign aid serves as a magnet for interest groups and generates further 
debate on the subject.   
By 1960, foreign aid was a centerpiece of the U.S. containment strategy.  As 
Kennedy came into power, the nation was already debating significant and meaningful 
changes in foreign assistance.  
E. PRESIDENTS KENNEDY AND JOHNSON: DEVELOPMENT DECADE 
“Flexible response” expressed John F. Kennedy’s overall foreign policy strategy.  
This strategy was designed to reduce tensions created by nuclear deterrence.  Early 
security challenges with the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises tested Kennedy’s resolve to 
avoid nuclear war more than any other President.  Perhaps due to the growing tensions, 
emphasis was placed on alternate means of security like foreign assistance.  In this 
environment “foreign aid . . . and the military assistance program [became] the most 
critical elements” in U.S. national security.73  Rostow’s development views influenced 
Kennedy’s policy by assuming that many underdeveloped countries could become strong 
trading partners and serve as strategic allies in defeating communism.74 
Kennedy recalibrated foreign assistance toward the original humanitarian 
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objectives espoused by Truman.  The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act consolidated many of 
the existing development programs under the newly established Agency for International 
Development (USAID).  This sub-cabinet level department focused exclusively on 
development issues rather than the more pressing security objectives.75  
Despite good intentions, the security environment during the Cold War continued 
to demand attention.  Relationships take time to solidify, so while the United States made 
appropriate diplomatic gestures, there were underlying currents, which challenged the 
alignment of humanitarian and security objectives.  Rakove argues that four challenges 
prevented successful alignment. 76   
First, imperialism was fresh in the minds of many developing countries.  Aid was 
perceived as a tool to maintain imperial control.  Second, many borders had been created 
by the colonial powers.  International institutions worked with western-defined 
boundaries while largely ignoring local rivalries.  Third, foreign aid funding attracted 
special interest groups, which put intense political pressure on Congress on conflicting 
interests.  Fourth, the Vietnam War captured the world’s attention. 
Vietnam became the most pressing security concern in the late 1960s.  As the 
United States realized it was in a fight beyond its expectations, public distrust led the 
Johnson administration to focus on ways to end the war and detracted from efforts to 
maintain long-term development goals.  The conflict absorbed increasingly significant 
amounts of economic assistance.  The Economic Support Fund, which was designed to 
strengthen strategic allies through political and economic assistance, spent nearly  
90 percent of its appropriations on Vietnam by the late 1960s.77 
Three other security challenges brought pressure on the foreign assistance agenda.  
First, Kennedy’s program to assist Latin America ran into problems after the United 
States invaded Cuba.  Countries that had been enthusiastic supporters of the United States 
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suddenly became distrustful of ulterior motives.  This mistrust played a role in Argentina, 
Brazil and Peru shifting away from U.S. backed constitutional reform agendas.78  Second, 
the Iranian Shaw took advantage of foreign aid politics by playing up the communist 
threat in order to win American economic and military assistance.  Although he was able 
to maintain power throughout the 1960s, it created an environment of distrust, which 
ultimately came back to haunt him and the United States in the late 1970s.79  Third, the 
United States provided both India and Pakistan with aid, which was later used to support 
their war against each other.   
As a result, foreign assistance was viewed with increased scrutiny.  By 1969 the 
United States development budget decreased from 0.57 percent of GNP in 1962 to  
0.33 percent.80 
NGOs began to be more politically active as money flowed into development 
programs.  Although their role in early debates was minimal, seeds were planted for NGO 
lobbyists.81  These organizations typically advocated for aid disbursement through multi-
lateral organizations such as the United Nations and displayed growing concern as aid 
took on a greater security role.   
As Marshall Plan recipients became more prosperous, they were expected to carry 
a portion of international aid responsibilities.  By 1960, the Development Assistance 
Group was formed by CEEC nations to move the aid agenda forward.82  During this time, 
these members of the “donors club” were recognized as an elite group and were expected 
to provide 1 percent of their gross national income to foreign assistance.  In some ways, 
this expectation served to further divide the world.  Perceived success focused on 
quantitative rather than qualitative impact and it led to increasingly blurred definitions of 
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foreign assistance.  During this era, the UN saw themselves as a single voice for 
humanitarian interests and an advocate for the unified interests of developing countries.   
As quantitative measurements became the standard, it became evident that development 
problems were often country or region specific.  As a result, the UN became a greater 
proponent of basic human needs. 83 
F. PRESIDENT NIXON: NEW DIRECTIONS TOWARD BASIC HUMAN 
NEEDS 
Nixon’s Cold War strategy of détente set the stage for his “New Directions” 
foreign assistance policy.  Within détente was the motive to “phase down American 
commitments in the world.” 84  The top priority during this period was Vietnam--America 
wanted out.   
The Vietnam War highlighted the failure of foreign aid to many politicians.  With 
two decades of foreign assistance experience it seemed that opponents were increasing as 
many promises from aid advocates were unfulfilled.  Billions of dollars had been spent 
with little results and American troops were dying on a daily basis.85  In this political 
climate New Directions was born. 
As the quality of aid was questioned, politicians attempted to create solutions 
through amendments to the 1961 FAA legislation.  Congress typically allowed the White 
House to create much of U.S. foreign policy, but by the 1970s tensions were so high that 
the Senate rejected the 1971 foreign assistance authorization bill-the first such bill ever 
rejected.86  
There were growing rifts on how foreign assistance policy should be conducted.  
President Nixon pressed for reform based on the 1969 Peterson Commission 
recommendations.  Among other things, they called for an increased role for the private 
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sector and recipient nations.  Additionally, security and humanitarian objectives  
continued to create confusion, which led to calls for a further separation of military and 
economic aid and even the abolishment of USAID.   
While Nixon’s recommended legislation failed (partly due to a lack of USAID 
support), Congress passed the New Directions legislation to drive aid closer to meeting 
basic human needs.  This congressionally led effort aimed to generate “interdependence” 
with recipient nations and re-energize foreign assistance toward human rights. 87   
For some, New Directions was an exclamation point on aid reform.  While it is 
still the foundation of much of today’s policies, it did not take long for further calls for 
change. 
G. PRESIDENT CARTER: SHIFTING THE STRATEGY 
President Carter entered office as a supporter of strong humanitarian focused 
programs.  He did not see how American fear of communism justified support for 
ruthless dictators with their anti-communist ideals.  Early in his Presidency he tolerated 
leftist revolutionaries and he averted a confrontational approach to the Soviet Union until 
they invaded Afghanistan. At that point, political pressure re-enthroned the fears he 
sought to overcome and foreign assistance continued to maintain a strong security-centric 
agenda.88  
Another challenge facing the Carter administration was the large and growing 
foreign aid bureaucracy.  In an effort to improve aid effectiveness and maintain a 
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1979.  The vision of this agency was to coordinate executive branch aid assistance into a 
“super aid coordinating body.”  In reality it ended up adding to the bureaucratic 
challenges and was disbanded in 1999.89 
H. PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE SUPREMACY OF SECURITY 
The foreign policy transition between President Reagan and Carter was one of 
stark contrasts.  President Reagan came to power in the midst of the Iranian hostage 
crisis.  He portrayed Carter as weak on foreign policy by focusing on Carter’s security 
failures in Iran and Russian expansion efforts into Afghanistan.  While Carter 
emphasized the human rights aspects of aid, Reagan justified all aid in security terms, 
even going as far as claiming that humanitarian objectives were achieved by “rolling 
back” Soviet expansion.90   
Reagan’s strategy focused on U.S. security efforts.  Countries with perceived 
strategic importance and friendly to the United States were rewarded with surges in 
economic and military assistance.  Israel and Egypt led receipts, while sub-Saharan 
Africa, arguably the region with greatest needs generally received the least.91  These 
relationships were strengthened despite human rights concerns.  South Africa offered the 
United States critical raw materials for its defense infrastructure and therefore earned 
partnership status despite apartheid policies.  Nicaragua’s Sandinista government had 
overthrown a dictator charged with corruption and human rights violations.  While Carter 
recognized the new Marxist regime, Reagan quickly sought its demise by supplying aid 
to anti-communist governments in Honduras and El Salvador.92  These were justified by 
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stating that “human rights is at the core of our foreign policy . . . it is its very purpose: the 
defense and promotion of freedom in the world.”93   
Also central to Reagan’s philosophy was tying foreign aid to free market 
principles.  The Caribbean Basin Initiative was designed to encourage trade relationships 
between U.S. Corporations and Caribbean countries.  To incentivize these relationships, 
economic aid to the area was increased by $350 million.94  As free markets were 
emphasized, so was a push for smaller government, which led to an increased emphasis 
on aid flowing through NGOs.  Congress mandated that a minimum level of 13.5 percent 
of economic aid should be funneled through NGOs beginning in 1981.  This requirement 
was based on the perception that NGOs are closer to the private sector, have better human 
needs capacity, serve without political agendas and work better with international 
NGOs.95 
In the early 1980s the budget faced challenges due to difficult economic times.  
Economic assistance went from 1.09 percent of the budget to 0.84 percent.  Military aid, 
on the other hand, experienced an increase, thereby confirming that security labels help 
win resources.96  
The 1987 Hamilton-Gilman Congressional Task Force addressed the “changing 
global conditions” and sought to reform foreign aid operations, examine requirements, 
and clarify aid’s role in foreign policy.  The recommendations were ignored, largely 
because Congress did not want to give up any “power of the purse.”97   
Congressional earmarks and conditions bogged down the ability to effectively 
execute policy.  For example, Reagan sought to allocate $500 million of a $1.7 billion 
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military aid request toward Israel’s needs.  Congress required $800 million for Israel 
without a topline increase.  This reduced the ability to meet commitments made to the 
other twenty-one nations.98  
Reagan’s foreign policy team initially sought bilateral aid over multilateral due to 
its “accountab[ility] to the American taxpayer.”99  The 1982 Mexican debt crisis caused a 
change of mind.  Debt crisis problems led to the “lost development decade” label as 
poverty alleviation efforts were set aside to pursue administrative adjustments.100   
I. PRESIDENT BUSH: THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
President Bush presided as the bipolar Cold War melted into a U.S. dominated 
Washington consensus, which championed market successes over state controlled 
solutions.  As the most significant foreign policy issue dissipated, President Bush faced 
uniquely challenging circumstances.  Although his leadership in foreign assistance was 
perceived as inadequate, much of this can be attributed to budget pressures, a new global 
environment, and the Gulf War. 
One of the outcomes of the Cold War victory was a $3 trillion national debt 
combined with a budget deficit near $220 billion.101  Defense and security budgets 
previously justified in the Cold War environment were no longer possible.  Domestic 
pressures demanded a return to smaller government and tighter budgets.     
One of the chief complaints against the Bush administration’s program was its 
slow response to Russian transition needs.  As Russia aimed to steer toward a free market 
economy, the United States appeared more concerned about interest payments due from 
the old regime than assisting in critical economic reforms. 102 The Soviet Union collapse 
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provided an opportunity for the United States to provide meaningful assistance toward 
free market reforms.  Instead, it planted seeds of mistrust. 
Aid to Israel and Egypt remained strong throughout his term.  This was due to the 
strategic importance of both countries and their roles during the Gulf War.  Israel 
withheld a military response to Iraqi attacks and Egypt assisted by forming coalitions and 
pressuring Iraq to conform to demands.103   
J. PRESIDENT CLINTON: GLOBALIZED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT  
In the 1990s world tensions, which had been contained, suddenly exploded.  UN 
peacekeeping operations soared from 11 in the 1980s to 69 in the 1990s—most of these 
took place in Africa where ethnic conflicts had been suppressed by colonialism and 
dictators.104  In this light, the security environment shifted toward multilateral peace 
operations and renewed calls for basic need assistance efforts.  Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda 
and others illustrate the complications the donor community faced. 
By the time the Clinton administration entered office “aid fatigue” had been 
engrained in the public psyche.  Once again a task force was created to craft 
recommendations in the new security environment.  Central to the U.S. foreign assistance 
challenges was that “it is burdened by too many responsibilities and expected to 
accomplish too many objectives.”105  As a result, USAID relied heavily on contractors 
(NGOs) to conduct nearly 75 percent of their overseas projects.106   
As the system provided incentives for a growing number of NGOs, another 
problem arose.  In the environment of donor-driven aid, humanitarian work became an 
industry.  Many organizations relied on humanitarian problems to maintain cash flow and 
NGOs often attracted the most educated citizens in a target country with good pay and 
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benefits.  Contracting for aid projects led to competition between donor-driven aid and 
genuinely local NGOs, which were not equipped with the same level of resources. 107   
In the end, the administration attempted to implement reforms, but efforts failed 
after Republicans took control of Congress in 1994.108  The Clinton administration’s 
challenges highlight how changing security and political environments impact the ability 
to make necessary course adjustments to stabilize foreign assistance efforts.  
Additionally, the constant call for reform impacts how effectively aid personnel are able 
to accomplish their work as they search for solutions to accomplish their tasks and 
sometimes create unanticipated burdens on the very populations they are trying to help.   
K. PRESIDENT BUSH: A RETURN TO SECURITY  
The September 11 terrorist attacks once again shifted the global security 
landscape.  Nations now had to worry about nonstate organizations taking advantage of 
open societies.  Shortly after the attacks President Bush’s National Security Strategy 
included development efforts as a critical component to enhance the principles of 
democracy.109   
President Bush pressed for a significant increase in foreign assistance funds 
including $15 billion for HIV/AIDS programs and the creation of the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA).  While the MCA served as a tool to fight terrorism through 
poverty reduction it was also an attempt to reform the U.S. development regime.  It set 
qualifying economic conditions and sought to enable aid recipients with an increased role 
in the process.  It also focused on developing nations that “rule justly, invest in their 
people, and encourage economic freedom.”110  
Owusu argues that the MCA is not organized to maximize the alleviation of 
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poverty or the reduction of terrorism. By focusing on conditions, MCA funds miss 
potential centers of destabilization where large numbers of people live in poverty and 
where terrorist ideologies are more likely to prosper.  He suggests that MCAs primary 
intentions were to initiate reforms that would reduce USAIDs influence and ability to 
succeed.111 
In 2006, Secretary Rice attempted to improve coordination and force a strategic 
focus between State Department and USAID through her “F process” initiative.  
Although recognized as a step in the right direction, a major weakness was that it did not 
bring in other government agencies that are involved in foreign assistance delivery and 
policymaking, nor did it take into consideration field experts.112  Brainard illustrates this 
weakness by pointing out that 47 U.S. government organizations attempt to accomplish 
50 different foreign assistance objectives.113 
The sudden security change in 2001 provided the thrust for major changes in the 
development regime.  President Bush rallied enough support to establish some 
reformative changes.  While the MCA was given a humanitarian mission aligned with 
long-term security objectives, it has been unable to effectively serve individuals outside 
of well-governed countries.  The scope of the problem remains too many organizations 
working on too many objectives.   
L. PRESIDENT OBAMA: REFORM STILL REQUIRED 
In 2009, President Obama also called for a comprehensive study examining all 
U.S. foreign assistance efforts in the executive branch.  Secretary Clinton directed a 
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review to be patterned after the Quadrennial 
Defense Review.   
There are also several legislative proposals awaiting action in various 
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Congressional committees.  The majority of these call for the development leg of U.S. 
security strategy to be increasingly transparent, refocused and reorganized.  Republicans, 
also favor reform, but emphasize that it needs to occur before appropriation increases, 
and that trade and investment should be strengthened and transparency should include 
NGOs who deliver much of the aid.114 
If history is any indicator, President Obama will be unable to effect significant 
foreign assistance reform.  Strong executive leadership and legislative cooperation are the 
foundations of meaningful reform efforts.  Aligning security and long-term humanitarian 
objectives is a challenge many Presidents have failed to successfully accomplish largely 
due to the checks and balances provided in the Constitution.   
M. CONCLUSION 
This chapter argued that consistency in foreign aid efforts is the biggest obstacle 
to successful foreign assistance from the point of view of recipients.  It examined the 
history of U.S. foreign assistance, what it was intended to accomplish, how programs 
were structured and how they evolved over time, and the key organizations used to 
execute policy.  
The fact remains that there is no easy solution.  The ideal structure from a 
humanitarian perspective would include an organization focused on long-term 
development objectives with consistent resourcing, invulnerable to changes in the 
security environment.  Recipient nations would play a central role in planning, 
programming and budgeting and would increasingly provide their own resources as they 
work toward a self-sustaining economy. 
This ideal however, is unrealistic in light of historical precedence.  First, the 
security environment remains the key driver in the way foreign assistance is delivered 
and resources are made available.  Second, the principal-agent problem remains. Political 
leaders are accountable to the American people first and foremost, so unless the people 
become convinced that long-term humanitarian objectives support American interests, 
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there will be funding challenges.  Third, budgets rise and fall due to numerous factors.  It 
is difficult to maintain consistent funding in a program that does not have an immediate 
security result.  
Fourth, the popularity of multilateral institutions and NGOs also seem to rise and 
fall.  These also are susceptible to U.S. policies and budgets.  Private NGOs that receive 
little or no funding from the government may be the most appropriate organizations to 
remain focused on long-term humanitarian objectives.  Their resources and capacity 
however are generally only a fraction of those controlled by the government.   
Finally, although recipient nations may be given a greater role in determining 
foreign assistance objectives that impact them, accountability ultimately runs through the 
American people.  Foreign leaders can find themselves in the difficult position of 
appealing to both their citizens and the American people. 
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III. COMPARING FOREIGN HIGHER EDUCATION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
This chapter sets the stage for the case comparisons by examining the evaluation 
of key parameters that impact the effectiveness of foreign assistance in greater detail.  
Since the U.S. foreign assistance system is not tailored to maximize long-term 
development in recipient countries there will be struggles to maintain consistently 
generous funding levels.  In light of this, the United States should include an exit strategy 
that is sustainable for recipients, minimizes resource fluctuations and leverages their 
ability to control any outcome.     
There are four planning considerations that can improve the chances for a 
sustainable and consistent foreign assistance program.  First, focus on recipient 
objectives. Second, provide stable funding.  Third, work toward a self-sustaining 
program.  Fourth, minimize dependency on U.S. appropriations or NGO donations. 
A. RECIPIENT OBJECTIVES 
The history of U.S. foreign aid shows that although humanitarian rhetoric offers 
short-term motivation, it needs to be clearly aligned with a strong U.S objective.115  One 
of the arguments against foreign developmental assistance is that by focusing on U.S. 
strategic interests, recipient needs are largely ignored.116  To strengthen recipient causes, 
planning systems should consider U.S. and recipient objectives equally during needs 
assessments.  The ideal process is similar to a contract in which a customer clearly 
defines requirements.  While recipients should not be able to make unrealistic demands, 
their inputs are critical to the long-term success of any operation.  An accurate 
assessment of problems will enhance the likelihood that solutions will be meaningful for 
both parties.117   
Similar to technical cooperation initiatives of the past, recipient communities are 
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less inclined to criticize programs that offer assistance.118  Without a structure that 
establishes and protects their inputs, recipients can easily be pushed aside while donors 
lead and pursue milestones that are attractive to their constituencies and that satisfy donor 
needs. 
By strengthening relationships and providing a forum for clear communication, 
the United States can curb future problems created by mistrust and miscommunication.  
When recipient objectives are at the forefront of planning, policymakers reduce the 
impact of inconsistent delivery and increase trust levels that can pay dividends in 
increased trust and security.  In the end, recipients define success, and therefore, they 
should have a larger role in defining the problem. 
B. STABLE FUNDING 
Stable funding consists of two elements.  First, donor government obligations are 
relatively low.  Second, funds are leveraged with commitments from other sources.   
The term “relatively low” is difficult to define.  Planners seeking to improve the 
likelihood of securing funds are dependent upon the political appropriations process.   
This process has many variables that create differing levels of political difficulty.  For the 
purposes of this paper, a low-cost program is one that can easily fit into an existing 
executive branch program.  Low-cost solutions will vary by program and perceived 
value, but in general this will minimize the level of scrutiny that would be given to other 
more expensive programs. 
Leveraging resources by partnering with other institutions provides another venue 
to enhance funding stability.  Partnerships not only provide additional resource options, 
but also strengthen institutional capacity.  In the modern aid environment, strong 
connections increase access to government appropriations and private donations.  During 
times of political scrutiny and challenges, these relationships create avenues for 
preservation of ongoing aid efforts, enabling key programs to be sustained.  
                                                 
118 Channing Arndt, “Technical Co-operation,” in Foreign Aid and Development : Lessons Learnt 
and Directions for the Future, ed. Finn Tarp and Peter Hjertholm (London: Routledge Press, 2000), 164–
66. 
 39
U.S. support for micro-finance programs is one example that illustrates broad 
funding stability.  First, it easily fits into existing foreign assistance appropriations.  The 
2011 budget request for all foreign assistance programs was $36.4 billion.  Of that, 
micro-financing falls under the “Economic Growth” category, which received more than 
$5.5 billion to meet eight objectives.  Of these, micro-financing received $279 million 
and ranks sixth.119  Additionally, USAID has partnered with Sweden and Japan in 
providing joint insurance for selected micro-finance programs.  It also partners with 
NGOs such as the Rockefeller and Gates foundations to fund for selected projects.120 
C. SELF-SUSTAINING PROGRAMS  
The most disastrous problem facing program consistency is the lack of incentives 
for self-sustaining entrepreneurial activities.  The variables for economic growth can be 
found within the formula used to calculate the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  GDP is 
comprised of Consumer spending (C) plus Investment (I) plus Government spending (G) 
plus Exports (X) minus Imports (M) or: GDP = C + I + G + (X-M). 
Most U.S. economic growth comes through private sector consumer spending.  In 
an aid-dependent country, overall GDP may be an illusion since it is often largely driven 
by government or aid agency transfers, which can inadvertently discourage private 
production in the recipient country.  One solution to this problem is to provide 
entrepreneurial incentives with the goal of ultimately generating tax revenues from 
successful ventures.   
Samli suggests that a strong entrepreneurial class is what many developing 
countries are missing.  Although cultures and geographical regions differ, entrepreneurs 
are important for change to occur.  They assist development by serving as risk-takers, 
finding innovative, quick and local solutions to market gaps, and by creating jobs.121   
He divides development into “exogenous” and “endogenous” efforts.  Exogenous 
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assistance includes many of the current efforts attempted by the foreign assistance 
regime.  These are well intentioned “top-driven” efforts where local conditions are not 
appropriately accounted for.  Endogenous assistance is considered a “bottom-up” 
approach driven by entrepreneurs.122  Exogenous efforts are driven by large institutions 
and can impact a wider swath of the population, but they have created problems for local 
populations.   
D. MINIMIZE DEPENDENCY  
Effective foreign assistance also removes incentives for dependency.  Some of the 
most vexing aid challenges are associated with dependency.  Due to its economic size, 
the United States must be careful how it exercises its influence.  Policymakers should 
carefully evaluate the ways that dependency can harm developing countries.  Foreign aid 
can create or add to political corruption, supplant domestic savings, create revenue or 
institutional dependency, and undermine incentives for entrepreneurship. 
Government leaders with access to tremendous amounts of money are often 
tempted to pursue personal interests at the expense of their public responsibility.  Some 
claim that corrupt leaders skim $1 trillion off the world economy each year.123  Donors 
sometime use NGOs to sidestep corrupt governments in aid delivery but this has been 
criticized due to the perceived undermining of authority.124 
One of the early arguments for foreign aid was that it could increase domestic 
savings that would serve as future investment.  Theoretically, aid would serve to meet 
immediate needs thereby freeing up resources for savings.  Research in 2001 validated a 
1972 claim that foreign assistance works to “supplant, not support, domestic savings.”125  
In effect, dependency on aid revenue is reflected in higher consumption levels creating a 
situation where a reduction in aid would mean more saving and investment. 
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When aid is a significant portion of a country’s GDP, revenue dependency can be 
momentous.  For example, Liberia’s aid revenues in 2008 were 185 percent of its GDP.  
Aid to Afghanistan and Burundi were also both over 40 percent of their respective 
GDPs.126  Should “donor fatigue” occur such that aid is reduced or removed, countries 
dependent on aid are left with tremendous challenges. 
Institutional weakness is another side effect.  For the recipient, foreign aid 
agencies transfer large amounts of money into the country.  People obtaining direct 
access to these agencies can inadvertently subvert local authority.  As citizens see well-
connected aid recipients and/or government officials that receive special privileges, 
government legitimacy may be questioned.   
Another unintended consequence of aid organizations operating within a country 
is the risk that institutions are weakened by competition for qualified labor.  Individuals 
will pursue employment in organizations that offer the greatest incentives.  When aid 
organizations offer better pay and benefits than private or public institutions, it can result 
in an internal brain drain, reducing capacity within the recipient country.  This type of 
institutional dependency goes both ways−recipients need the aid, but donor agencies 
become dependent on the problems of the recipient in order to preserve their sponsors 
goodwill and maintain their operations.   
Conditionality often serves to worsen these relationships as donors tie recipients 
with well-meaning, but often unrealistic terms.  In 1992, Ghana provided significant pay 
raises to military and civil servants.  While this was designed to build institutional 
capacity, it was a violation of World Bank aid terms.  As a result, aid was withheld until 
the next year, which caused problems for Ghana and its donors.127    
Possible unintended consequences are best evaluated through a system designed 
to enhance cooperation.  In the end, preventing dependency is easier than overcoming it.   
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E. MICRO-FINANCING 
Micro-finance provides a model that illustrates how foreign assistance can 
develop stability for recipients and an exit strategy for donors.  Since 1976, micro-credit 
has brought hope to millions and has become the poster child for endogenous 
entrepreneurial development.  Conceptually, it provides capital for individuals who then 
generate revenue and create jobs.  Therefore it is an attractive option for stimulating 
entrepreneurial activity, especially in post-conflict areas with large informal economies.     
Allowing micro-credit to operate in an informal economy can serve as a precursor 
toward a more formal economy.  In cases where “development from above” is slow to 
respond, it adds to local stability.128  In terms of dependency, most micro-lending 
institutions still require subsidies to stay in business.129  In sub-Saharan Africa these 
institutions deal with high costs, high lending rates and low (if any) profits.  Despite this, 
micro-finance is expanding.130  While private investment is required to continue meeting 
expanding demands, socially driven NGOs are best situated to cover the gap.131  Despite 
these challenges, micro-finance continues to serve as a source of entrepreneurial activity.  
Entrepreneurs assume risk, which means the most innovative will survive.  Calls for 
micro-lending institutions to innovate or go out of business also symbolize the essence of 
entrepreneurship.132  On the one hand, there is an increase in small-scale entrepreneurs; 
on the other, there is the potential for minimal levels of dependency.  While world 
poverty may not be eliminated, many people have opportunities previously unavailable to 
them due to micro-credit.133 
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F. HIGHER EDUCATION 
Many higher education programs can be modeled after micro-finance initiatives.  
As higher education boosts human capital, wages and productivity, entrepreneurial 
momentum strengthens the private sector and any move toward free markets.  It also 
serves to balance endogenous and institutional capacity in developing countries, which 
are important for long-term economic stability. 134  Education capacity and 
complementary public policy can stimulate endogenous economic development.  Given a 
friendly business climate, even a small number of educated citizens create opportunities 
that raise living standards and generate skilled employment to “refine, produce, market 
and distribute their resulting products and services.”135   
Higher education does not guarantee employment and it can create additional 
problems without proper planning.  Some countries, such as Zambia, experience high 
levels of postgraduate unemployment for many of its youth.136  Many developing 
countries have severe problems with brain drain resulting from higher education 
opportunities.  This occurs as highly skilled individuals leave the country seeking greater 
opportunities.  While there may be positive consequences as currency flows back into the 
country as remittances, most view the lost human capital, savings and tax revenues as 
economic burdens that are difficult to overcome.137   
These problems illustrate the critical requirement to focus on recipient needs.  
Cooperative strategic planning can create a program that meets recipient requirements.  
For example, Greek youth with degrees that benefit the private sector have a lower rate of 
unemployment than their counterparts.138  Meanwhile, although entrepreneurship is 
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viewed as the solution to high unemployment in Poland, very few individuals have the 
necessary aptitude or skills to be a successful entrepreneur.  As a result, Powlowska 
argues that the Polish higher education community should be used to develop 
entrepreneurial skillsets.139   
G. CONCLUSION 
Due to their interaction with entrepreneurs and the public sector, micro-financing 
and higher education programs offer an opportunity to evaluate the four key planning 
considerations.  When compared to other programs they serve as models that can 
illustrate a workable exit strategy for foreign assistance programs.  While recipient 
engagement varies, they provide relatively low-cost solutions that can encourage 
entrepreneurship while minimizing dependency.   
Due to the large amount of available research on micro-finance and the growing 
number of people receiving a basic education, this study focuses on higher education 
programs.  As developing countries benefit from higher numbers of primary school 
graduates, the demand for higher education will significantly increase.  Many students 
will be first generation graduates with high expectations.  An absence of strategic 
planning may result not only in disappointment for individuals who lack employable 
skills, but also in heightened security challenges for weak governments.  Alternatively, 
careful planning might anticipate needs that will empower more citizens and increase 
stability in the developing world.  Self-sustaining higher education programs will enable 
recipient governments to continue programs they consider beneficial.  This research 
attempts to add to the conversation on how an appropriate U.S. exit strategy can add to 
regional stability and increase trust between countries.  
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IV. FORD FOUNDATION: NONRELIGIOUS PRIVATE 
ASSISTANCE 
A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
The Ford Foundation was established in 1936 by Henry Ford’s son.  The 
foundation has provided almost $10 billion to various groups and organizations that aim 
to protect the environment, establish peace, and promote welfare.  Its efforts began with a 
local focus primarily in the Michigan area, but in 1951 under the leadership of former 
ECA administrator Paul Hoffman it expanded to serve international development 
struggles.  The Ford Foundation currently has nearly $11 billion in assets to meet its 
socially targeted agenda.140   
The Ford Foundation has a generous history supporting higher education.  Since 
1950, it has provided postgraduate education for more than 30,000 students from 70 
countries.141  This tradition continued as the Ford Foundation International Fellowship 
Program (IFP) was created in December 2000 to provide higher education to 
disadvantaged minorities in developing countries.142   
By addressing social deficiencies on the development front, IFP serves to 
stimulate endogenous development by strengthening leadership capacity in areas that 
seem to lack representation.  By removing barriers to opportunity, internal development 
is more likely to succeed.  The cornerstone concept to IFPs strategy is that a native leader 
entrenched in local development issues will generate more appropriate solutions for the 
most pressing needs.   
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1. Problem  
IFP argues that disadvantaged social groups in developing countries have not had 
opportunities to develop leaders to address the many economic capacity shortages they 
face.  Higher education scholarship programs have generally been used to develop 
national leaders, but they tend to ignore people from less privileged or popular groups. 143  
By ignoring these groups development gaps occur that prevent institutional capacity from 
reaching areas with high levels of development challenges. 
The Ford Foundation recognized that a broad-based universal definition of social 
injustice could have negative side effects and would likely undermine overall program 
success.  They wanted to address the disadvantages that many groups faced, but 
recognized a small office staff geographically separated from developing countries would 
be unable to understand the specific development needs in each of the regions it served. 
The details of discrimination vary by country and region.  In Nigeria, for example, 
nearly 54 percent of the population resides in the north, but 85 percent of Nigerian 
university students are from the south.  This disparity is the result of a higher education 
system originating from British Christian missionaries.  The north, which is largely 
Islamic, views much of the Nigerian university system as an extension of Christian 
values.144  
Due to the engrained societal expectations from more than 2,000 years of the 
caste system, India faces an almost overwhelming challenge.  In this unique system, only 
5 percent are considered “mainstream” after accounting for various tribal, religious, 
oppressed, and linguistic minorities.145 
Since the mid-1990s, Brazil has debated how to deal with racial discrepancies in 
                                                 
143 Bollag, “Ford Foundation Creates Global Fellowship Program.”  
144 Wilson Akpan and Akinyinka Akinyoade, “Nigeria: Higher Education and the Challenge of 
Access,” in Origins, Journeys and Returns: Social Justice in International Higher Education, ed. Toby 
Alice Volkman, Joan Dassin, and Mary Sabina Zurbuchen (New York: Social Science Research Council, 
2009), 92. 
145 Ganesh Devy, “India: Layered Inequalities,” in Origins, Journeys and Returns: Social Justice in 
International Higher Education, ed. Toby Alice Volkman, Joan Dassin, and Mary Sabina Zurbuchen (New 
York: Social Science Research Council, 2009), 178. 
 47
higher education.  Politicians attempted to address opportunity gaps between rich and 
poor, which were largely divided along racial lines.  In 2000 slightly more than 0.5 
percent of the Brazilian native population was attending postgraduate school, compared 
to more than 10 percent of Brazil’s white population.  In 2001, President Lula’s 
administration participated in the World Conference against Racism and determined to 
utilize higher education as a tool to narrow the gap.  Since that time, much of Brazil’s 
higher education community has adopted affirmative action policies to assist the 
country’s black and indigenous populations.146 
Although regional specifics differ widely, women and rural minorities are 
generally underrepresented in all regions.  Other common factors that contribute to 
discrimination include low levels of education, high levels of poverty, ethnicity and 
physical disability.147 
Many marginalized groups inherently distrust outside efforts for assistance.  Due 
to historical mistreatment and abuses their defenses often lead them to perceive many 
programs as unfair.  Additionally, many hesitate to participate in a program because they 
view minority efforts as unfruitful.148  For example, Muslims in India are heavily 
underrepresented in public service institutions.  Although a democracy such as India 
attempts to overcome discrimination, Muslims are hesitant to apply for such jobs because 
of perceived favoritism.149 Any program attempting to serve disadvantaged groups must 
address negative perceptions through fairness and transparency. 
Targeting marginalized groups is one challenge, but identifying qualified 
individuals adds another dimension.  IFP needed to provide selection criteria, which 
balanced the social disadvantages with individual initiative.  Although social status 
narrows the field of potential participants, IFP aimed to find the right people within those 
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groups. The Ford Foundation saw its role as “nurturing social justice leadership.”150  In 
this sense, it was not looking to build leaders, but to give existing leaders additional tools 
provided through higher education.   
Individual selection therefore focused on finding leaders committed to social 
development.  One obvious measurement for IFP participants was academic background.  
By definition, a postgraduate education required previous academic performance.  Since 
education already separates the fortunate from the less fortunate, the challenge was 
finding successful individuals appropriately committed to causes that would enhance 
development.151  IFP sought individuals from targeted groups who had sufficient 
academic background, and had demonstrated leadership and commitment to 
development.  
Another problem facing institutions offering higher education to individuals from 
developing countries is the “brain drain” of highly educated people.  There is 
considerable debate over whether such a resource drain is harmful to an economy.  Some 
argue that globalization provides expatriates greater opportunity to fill labor gaps in 
developed countries while sending money back to family and friends in a developing 
country.  Others argue that the missing skillsets from developing countries keep 
developing countries short on necessary human capital.152  For an organization attempting 
to “nurture” development leaders, it is imperative to create incentives for the best and 
brightest to return to their country of origin.   
Return rates vary by country and profession.  For example, only 25 percent of 
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20 percent of Jamaican medical doctor graduates return to Jamaica.  These are viewed as 
missed opportunities and a loss of resources from a developing country as these highly 
qualified individuals are not present to provide stability and revenues to a region in 
need.153 
Education also requires competent communication skills.  Most fellowship 
programs require a minimal level of English or at least a second language.  Lack of 
access to these languages serves as a barrier, which any program targeting marginalized 
groups needs to address.154  Any scholarship opportunity must offer one of three options.  
The first would be to offer a program in the local area where language is not a challenge.  
The second would assume that applicants already speak English or another common 
language.  The third would prepare students with sufficient language proficiency.  Many 
developing countries do not have sufficient university capacity.  To require standard 
English proficiency levels or another language would significantly narrow the pool of 
applicants and work against the desired perception of fairness. 
The opportunity for international study adds a cultural challenge to the desired 
program.  While this element provides unique obstacles for any fellowship, those coming 
from disadvantaged backgrounds may face additional problems.  As a community leader, 
their departure may be viewed negatively by those within their community.  Projects they 
had been working on may lose momentum as leadership adjusts.  There may also be very 
high expectations from community members and themselves.  While this is a positive 
statement on their leadership ability, they will likely find themselves in an environment 
where they are not comfortable and where their measured performance may be below 
their personal expectations.  The transition from a community leader to a student may 
also be challenging psychologically and difficult to overcome.155 As they return home, 
they may perceive themselves inadequate and there will be challenges of re-integrating 
into the culture they left.  Exposure to a culture with opportunities for personal gain may 
enhance the temptation to remain and pursue those opportunities. 
                                                 
153 Dassin, “Higher Education as a Vehicle for Social Justice: Possibilities and Constraints,” 27. 
154 Zurbuchen, “The Question of ‘Disadvantage’,” 56. 
155 Volkman, “Journeys: The International Experience,” 202. 
 50
2. Solution 
In the late 1990s, the Ford Foundation had benefitted from higher than average 
market returns and wanted to make a significant statement related to the higher education 
challenge.156  Their solution was a tailor made program designed to provide a Master’s or 
Doctorate degree for 350 students per year for 10 years.157  They initially provided a $330 
million endowment that was to be managed by IEE and executed locally by the twenty-
two international partners in targeted countries.  In 2006, the program was extended to 
2013 with an additional $75 million donation aimed at providing postgraduate education 
for another 800 individuals.158  
IFP argues that three primary features make it a unique fellowship experience.  
First, it has a “decentralized operational structure,” which uses a central staff and local 
partners in each country to execute the program.  Second, it has a flexible approach 
designed to enable motivated individuals within disadvantaged groups to succeed.  Third, 
it targets leaders who can influence socially disadvantaged communities.159   
3. Organizational Structure and Flexibility 
The decentralized operating structure seeks to take advantage of existing 
educational expertise on global and local levels.  This model enables the Ford Foundation 
to provide financing and general oversight and to take advantage of existing capacity to 
protect its broad socially based objectives.   
On the global level, IFP contracted program administration to the Institute of 
International Education (IIE) and established a small office in their New York 
headquarters.160  IIE provides expertise and networking opportunities for the international  
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higher education community as well as access to many large scholarship and endowment 
programs such as the U.S. State Department sponsored Fulbright scholarship.161   
Eight staff members, led by the Executive Director, oversee the daily global 
operations of the program, coordinate with the fund’s Board of Directors, the finance and 
program advisory committees as well as the twenty-two international partners.162  They 
also provide general guidance and ensure that local decisions are consistent with program 
objectives.163  
At the local level, twenty-two countries were selected for program participation, 
largely based on existing Ford Foundation offices.164  In order to provide local influence, 
organizations with higher education expertise were selected to apply the program in each 
country.  Local IPs are responsible to recruit, select and support participants throughout 
all stages of the program.  Many of these international partners (IP) are nonprofit or 
research organizations with an established country presence. 165  In many cases IPs 
coordinate and work together to implement regional-specific aspects of the program.  For 
example, the Association of African Universities in Ghana serves as the main 
coordinating body for West Africa as well as Ghana’s expert, while Pathfinder 
International and West African Research Center provide country specific inputs for 
Nigeria and Senegal.166 
Additionally, IFP has teamed up with more than five hundred universities to 
advance the unique aspects of their fellowship.167  These relationships allowed doors to  
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open, which had not previously been available.  For example, IFP worked with several 
institutions to adjust entrance requirements while maintaining high quality graduation 
requirements.168     
4. Targeting Disadvantaged Groups and Individuals  
IFP demonstrated flexibility as it avoided a narrow definition of marginalized 
groups among the twenty-two participating countries.  This approach encouraged a 
significant amount of interaction and discussion for IPs.  Following a variety of inputs 
from IPs, the global staff shaped broad parameters that were common across all regions.  
These parameters included economic and social factors such as employment, income and 
poverty, geographic location, family education history, as well as group and political 
identity.169  This allowed IPs to define and evaluate disadvantaged groups found in each 
country, maintain local flexibility to qualitatively measure unique circumstances and 
provide global transparency.170   
A disadvantaged background serves only as a prerequisite to program selection.  
IPs look for individuals within target groups that have an appropriate blend of personal 
initiative, leadership and commitment to improve their communities.171  Each individual 
is evaluated on four specific criteria, which allow local selection committees to identify a 
“personal trajectory” for each applicant to anticipate program completion followed by a 
likely return to their community.172   
First, social marginalization is weighted into an individual score. 173  Although 
two individuals may come from a minority group, each will have unique experiences.  
This indicator is an attempt to evaluate the specific challenges that each person has 
overcome.  The foundation discovered early that methods to measure target group 
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membership are necessary.  In Mexico, the application included a personal statement 
declaring ethnicity and ability to speak the native language along with signatures from 
group leaders and selection committee interviews.174       
Second, applicants are evaluated academically.  In the IFP, academic performance 
is atypical when compared to other fellowships.  While most programs require strong and 
recent academic performance, as well as a high level of foreign language proficiency, IFP 
shies away from these requirements.  Of the four acceptance parameters, academic 
performance carried the lowest relative weight due to the program’s overall objectives.175  
In fact, the only reason individuals are evaluated academically is because an 
undergraduate degree is a universal requirement for any reputable postgraduate program.  
Managers in Vietnam learned the value of including minimum academic standards when 
many of their initially desired selectees were unable to meet even reduced admission 
requirements in a university postgraduate program.176  
IFPs flexibility and partnerships enabled this minimal standard to take hold.  They 
were able to eliminate age and recent college attendance requirements.  This opened 
doors for people from all walks of life and especially development leaders.  This brought 
its own set of challenges as many possible applicants had been away from school for 
several years and had established professions and families.  While this allowed many 
nontraditional applicants to participate, it also eliminated many who saw greater 
opportunity costs than potential rewards from completing the program.  University and 
local IPs created an environment of support so as to almost guarantee academic success.  
They worked to provide lower entrance requirements while providing up to one year of 
preparatory training in language, computer and academic assistance.177    
IFP also allowed participants to choose from a range of degree options, which 
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aligned with Ford Foundation’s social agenda.178  There were seven areas that fellows 
pursued with 29 percent choosing a degree in “Environment, Health and Applied 
Sciences.” Other degrees in order of popularity are: “Education and Communications” 
(17 percent), “Law, Governance and Human Rights” (15 percent), “Social Sciences”  
(15 percent), “Development Studies” (10 percent), “Arts and Humanities” (9 percent), 
and “Economics and Business Administration” (5 percent).179  Although there were 
regional disparities, roughly 80 percent of participants pursued the three year Master’s 
track.180   
Participants crafted not only their personal degree plans, but they also chose the 
university and location for their experience.  This was critical for leaders with personal 
considerations such as family responsibilities.  If participants were not confident in their 
language abilities or had other concerns, they were able to select a program in their 
region that minimized the cultural obstacles.  Nearly 35 percent chose to remain in their 
home countries while slightly over 50 percent chose an English speaking experience in 
the United States, Canada or the United Kingdom.181 
The third selection parameter is an individual commitment to a pertinent social 
cause.182  Local factors played a critical role in determining the causes in each country.  
In many situations, this endeavor required proactive recruiting techniques beyond 
standard marketing.  A proper mix of community marketing, presentations and personal 
interviews assisted selection committees in their quest to find the right people.  
Identifying personal drive is important in identifying and recruiting individuals with a 
passion to return home and apply the knowledge they obtain.  
Fourth, leadership ability and potential were evaluated to determine anticipated 
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program impact.183  Finding the right balance between the third and fourth criterion was 
important in choosing the right people.  Leadership ability serves to magnify the passion 
and effectiveness for a development cause.  Since IFP was created to assist the socially 
disadvantaged, it became important to avoid people with a “victim culture” mentality.  In 
South Africa, for example, this was measured through “initiative, persistence and 
tenacity” in overcoming personal situations that placed them at a disadvantage.184 
Recruitment was much more than identifying capable participants; trust building 
with entire communities and other NGOs was also important.  Due to the perceived 
elitism in higher education, many marginalized groups were hesitant to participate or 
believed that programs advertising equal opportunity rarely achieve their stated claims.  
Marketing requires much more than conventional means provided through the media, it 
requires personal interactions, discussions and trust building activities to convince 
communities that the program is fair and transparent.185  Most importantly, the program 
must be executed in a manner consistent with stated objectives. 
By addressing social injustice, IFP needed to maintain the perception of fairness 
and equity.  For this reason, transparency throughout the decision-making process was a 
constant concern.  To address critical problems and maintain transparency, the IFP model 
not only seeks to use local partnerships to identify disadvantaged groups, appropriately 
recruit and select the right individuals, but to also provide sufficient support before, 
during and after graduation.186 
One of the early critiques against the IFP was that these students would not be 
able to succeed in a rigorous academic environment due to lowered entrance standards.187  
                                                 
183 Zurbuchen, “The Question of ‘Disadvantage’,” 46. 
184 Shireen Hassim, “South Africa: Justice and Disadvantage in a New Democracy,” in Origins, 
Journeys and Returns: Social Justice in International Higher Education, ed. Toby Alice Volkman, Joan 
Dassin, and Mary Sabina Zurbuchen (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2009), 77. 
185 Zurbuchen, “The Question of ‘Disadvantage’,” 55. 
186 “The IFP Model,” International Fellowship Fund, 
http://www.fordifp.org/AboutIFP/TheIFPModel/tabid/63/language/en-US/Default.aspx (accessed 
12/2/2010). 
187 Navarrete and Acevedo, “Mexico and Guatemala: Multiple Faces of Marginalization,” 133 and 
250–52. 
 56
Two aspects of the program were central to its nearly 90 percent graduation rate.188  First, 
previously mentioned program filters targeted motivated individuals who had 
demonstrated previous academic success.  Second, the fellowship was structured with a 
support system designed to assist students throughout their IFP experience.   
IFP did everything it could to ensure success for individual fellows.  Following 
acceptance into the program, “fellows-select” were provided significant preparation 
opportunities in meeting language, academic research and computer skill requirements.  
Additionally, since university admission was not an IFP prerequisite, IPs worked with 
many participants on their application process while university partnerships were 
established to enable “conditional admissions” for participants.189  
These preparations and relationships secured admission for nearly all 
participants.190  After they begin their education, IPs, universities and other institutions 
such as the East-West Center in Hawaii work to support students in their courses of study 
and with cultural challenges they may face.191  Most of the fellows have not previously 
left their home country and therefore culture shock is common. Many fellows require 
continued language assistance and ongoing academic counseling to succeed in the 
program.192  While this can be a challenge, time is built into program plans for these 
supporting aspects.  As they graduate, they continue to receive support through their 
university and IP relationships along with other alumni.  These networking and support 
opportunities serve to assist them when they return to their homes, along with 
employment counseling and general personal interaction.193   
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B. EVALUATING PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
This section will analyze possible policy implications of the IFP becoming a 
government funded foreign assistance program.  As previously mentioned, foreign 
assistance planners may minimize program fluctuations by remaining focused on 
recipient objectives, providing stable funding, and working toward self-sustaining 
programs while reducing dependency on government appropriations or NGO donations.   
The Ford Foundation essentially served as the central appropriator and utilized its 
network of NGOs and university partnerships to execute the program.  The IFP model is 
built on the premise that building social capacity benefits economic development.  While 
this may have merit, development issues may get lost in the pursuit of a social justice 
agenda. 
Some advocates argue that IFP illustrates how minorities can succeed in 
postgraduate education.194  Although this is true, proving ability is not the stated purpose 
of the fellowship even though some have politicized its affirmative action aspects.  This 
illustrates how a social agenda can distract from a development agenda.  A 
developmental focus remains focused on reducing the opportunity gap while a social 
focus champions minority rights and ability.  Shifting the debate to the ability of minority 
groups increases the risk of losing focus on sustainable economic behavior and the 
likelihood of political scrutiny. 
Does the United States want to get extensively involved in the social justice 
debate?  Advocates argue that U.S. participation shows leadership while opponents argue 
that it is meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign countries.  Although IFP allows 
each country to define who is marginalized, it is important to recognize that the Ford 
Foundation’s mission is to “support leaders and organizations on the frontlines of social 
change worldwide.”195  Participation in social justice foreign assistance programs is not 
apolitical and serves to attract unwanted attention and criticism.   
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1. Recipient Objectives 
Remaining focused on recipient objectives is one of IFPs greatest strengths.  The 
Ford Foundation used a broad network of partner NGOs to ascertain recipient needs by 
seeking those with the greatest development needs.  The organization was structured to 
identify participants based on recipient definitions and inputs.  It provided flexibility that 
partners utilized to accomplish the stated objective.  Partners at the local level were 
resourced to find and prepare participants for a successful fellowship experience.  
Networks at hosting educational institutions minimized failure by helping students gain 
admission and assisting them throughout the program.  Graduates and local partners also 
provided mentoring and encouragement.   
As of 2008, 3,300 participants had been selected from over 65,000 applicants.  Of 
those working toward a master’s degree, 89 percent successfully graduated and  
83 percent had returned to their country.  Additionally, many fellows were honored with 
prestigious grants and service awards.196  Of those who had not returned home, a portion 
had extended educational opportunities through other programs. While acknowledging 
that any education program will experience loss of human talent and resources, IFP 
results compare favorably with other programs that experience “brain drains” higher than 
IFP’s return rate.197   
IFP clearly demonstrated that its selection and support processes were superior.  
The model proved effective in terms of academic performance and high numbers of 
graduates who returned home to serve in a manner consistent with their education.  In the 
end, the Foundation enabled IFP to maintain focus on stated recipient objectives and 
needs.    
2. Stable Funding 
IFPs thirteen-year commitment amounted to $405 million, which breaks down to 
approximately $31 million per year, or $93,000 for each of the 4,300 projected 
participants.  With a 90 percent graduation rate and 85 percent rate of returning home, 
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expenses rise to between $100,000 per graduate and $110,000 per graduate who returns 
home.  From an appropriations perspective, a $31 million annual commitment seems 
reasonable, however policy makers would need to evaluate the per person costs.   
Measuring the value of social leadership will remain a challenge and the subject 
of debate.  Social justice advocates would argue that any measurement must include 
intangible values.  For example, if a community significantly reduces domestic violence 
then it builds capacity for economic development.  Eradication of small pox, educating 
women and the green revolution are other capacity building examples. 
Opponents will highlight that per person expenses are between sixteen and twenty 
times the per capita GDP (PPP) in the twenty two participating countries.198  For a 
relative comparison, the United States would spend between $736,000 and $920,000 on a 
postgraduate education for American students.199     
This program was fully funded by Ford Foundation.  No cost sharing was 
included in the plan.  Although IFP relied solely on a single source of funds, subsequent 
programs with similar missions could access a variety of cost-sharing opportunities. 
3.  Self-Sustaining Development 
IFP was not envisioned or organized as a self-sustaining private sector program.  
It targeted leaders in vulnerable areas to effect development through the efforts of these 
leaders and those they influence.  Individual participants have already been credited with 
using their education to improve many communities.  This paper will not attempt to 
measure or debate the positive contributions participants have made.  Their efforts may 
generate a variety of initiatives that benefit communities, but once funding ends in 2013, 
no additional scholarships will be provided through this program.   
Although the Ford Foundation chose to use IFP as an experiment with a clear end 
date, a similar program may mitigate sustenance challenges by establishing an ongoing 
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endowment.  This would require a large upfront investment, but it could extend desired 
outcomes to more participants.  Depending on local needs, IFP could serve to encourage 
entrepreneurship in targeted areas.  In this sense, a larger number of leaders would return 
home to work in revenue generating sectors and could help establish self-sustaining 
businesses or other economic investments. 
4.  Minimize Dependency  
In terms of endogenous economic development, very few IFP graduates return to 
work for private sector businesses.  Most work for the public sector or international 
NGOs.200  Although they tend to receive higher personal wages and promotions as a 
result of their fellowship experience, these sectors in general fail to generate tax 
revenues.  Most NGOs depend upon external donations or government assistance and 
therefore may not be the most efficient option for a country that is striving to increase 
productivity in its economy. 
Many developing countries are saturated with well-intentioned NGOs that are 
incentivized to increase external donations.  This revenue source tends to decrease when 
there are difficult economic times (in the donor country) or when donors underestimate 
development challenges.  Perceived need, therefore, becomes the primary export of a 
developing country.   
This is not to suggest that capacity building is unimportant.  Infrastructure and 
institutions are an important aspect of a stable economy, but in order to build sustainable 
economies efforts need to shift toward building or strengthening market activity, 
ultimately generating tax revenues to support government infrastructure and other 
investments.  An appropriate exit strategy for NGOs would focus on ways to stimulate 
entrepreneurial activities, increasing potential tax revenues.  In this way, success would 
be measured by whether countries are able to sustain a given program.  
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C. U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The Ford Foundation’s IFP has been a successful experiment at nurturing socially 
disadvantaged leaders.  They have addressed the opportunity gap within developing 
countries by enabling 4,300 highly motivated leaders to enhance their education with a 
world-class fellowship experience.  They used a decentralized operational structure 
combined with flexible local partnerships to target marginalized groups.  They recruited 
and selected motivated individuals who were committed to social development causes.  
Local IPs and university partners provided support before, during and after their 
fellowship.  Many of these leaders have returned home to better opportunities and are 
seeking ways to improve their communities.  In the end, individual IFP fellows will 
determine the success of the program.  Early indications are positive, and although the 
program ends in 2013, the networks and relationships established by IFP fellows will 
determine perceived value more than anything else.   
As a potential model for a U.S. foreign assistance program it has some strengths 
and weaknesses.  In terms of cost, annual appropriations would generally fly under the 
radar although the per-person cost may attract attention.  Ultimately, policy makers 
would need to evaluate the value of graduating leaders and their impact on developing 
countries.  As presently constituted, the program would be dependent upon annual 
appropriations and graduates would be trained to work for NGOs, which would be a 
magnet for additional donations and appropriations.   
Two structural adjustments would encourage an economically viable approach.  
First, using an endowment instead of appropriations would require higher upfront costs, 
but would extend the program’s length and may be leveraged through cost-sharing with 
other sources.  Second, an increase in the number of leaders focused on private sector 
solutions would increase revenue generating employment.   
These modifications would strengthen the sustainability of the program.  
Additionally, it might also serve to encourage investment and provide a greater balance 
between capacity building NGOs and profit-oriented businesses. (See IFP Summary at 
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V. USAID-HED: BILATERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 
A. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
In the early 1990s, the foreign assistance community was looking for ways to 
more effectively deliver aid while the six American academic associations were seeking 
ways to build stronger relationships with the government.  With the end of the Cold War, 
these academic institutions envisioned “interactive” partnerships replacing many of the 
independent efforts to affect economic development through higher education.201   
The six participating academic associations include the American Council on 
Education (ACE), the American Association of Community Colleges, the American 
Association of State Colleges and Universities, the Association of American Universities, 
the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, and the Association 
of Public and Land-Grant Colleges.202  Although membership and specific roles differ, 
each association serves to advance higher education objectives for member institutions by 
advocating for pro-education policies, providing forums for collaboration and by seeking 
ways to “contribute to a stronger nation and better world.”203  Together, they provide 
access to more than 4,450 institutions, along with millions of faculty members and 
students.204   
As the world was rapidly changing and becoming more globalized, the higher 
education community projected that development assistance needs would significantly 
increase.  This was viewed by academia as an opportunity to provide solutions to an 
international problem and strengthen American students and higher education 
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institutions.  A partnership with USAID would deliver a front row seat on development 
issues while providing USAID access to vast amounts of educational resources and 
people.  
The Association Liaison Office for University Cooperation in Development 
(ALO) was originally created in 1992 to serve as a liaison between the academic 
community and USAID in order to “further the engagement of higher education with 
[United States]’ development goals.”205  This symbiotic relationship enabled USAID to 
leverage its efforts to meet growing development demands despite shrinking staffs.206  
ALO was able to link USAIDs development expertise and networks in developing 
countries with 90 percent of the accredited postgraduate institutions in the United States. 
This arrangement served as a top-to-bottom initiative calculated to build institutional and 
human capacity.   
Institutional capacity was enhanced as higher education institutions from 
developing countries and the United States interacted by providing training, resources 
and advice on how to more effectively operate.  Human capacity was improved through 
grant and scholarship programs for students and faculty.   
In 1997, USAID initiated the “competitive awards process” through an agreement 
with the academic associations that attempted to create many collaborative 
relationships.207 This process became a resourcing tool that strengthened ALO operations 
and enhanced institutional and human relationships.  By offering small grants, USAID 
provided incentives to initiate project-based partnerships and which could develop into 
working relationships.   
In 2005, ALO changed its name to the Higher Education for Development (HED) 
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in order to more closely align its higher education objectives.208  This organization serves 
to provide a bilateral foreign assistance program through university partnerships while 
serving USAIDs development goals of: agriculture, democracy and governance, 
economic growth and trade, education, environment, global partnerships, global health 
and humanitarian assistance.209   
This paper will primarily analyze a specific HED partnership program known as 
the Training, Internships, Exchanges and Scholarships (TIES) Initiative in Mexico.  TIES 
has its conceptual roots in the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the 2001 Partnership for Prosperity.   
While NAFTA led to a strong rise in Mexican investment, trade and employment 
it also increased the rich-poor gap in many areas of Mexico.  In early 2001, President Fox 
of Mexico and President Bush attempted to address this gap with the Partnership for 
Prosperity initiative.  In this partnership they agreed that “among our highest priorities is 
unfettering the economic potential of every citizen, so each may contribute fully to 
narrowing the economic gaps between and within our societies.”210   
TIES became a sub-initiative within the larger presidential vision of reducing the 
economic gap between rich and poor.  USAID looked to HED to establish a program that 
achieved three objectives that fit within the Partnership for Prosperity’s larger umbrella.  
These objectives are: build human capacity, strengthen institutional capacity, and support 
USAIDs larger strategic goals in Mexico. 211 
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B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
1. USAID 
USAID is led by a presidentially appointed Administrator who is responsible for 
international economic development and many foreign assistance programs.  The 
September 2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development attempts to 
address the growing interagency confusion with foreign assistance by including USAIDs 
Administrator in National Security Council meetings.  Additionally, it seeks to raise role 
of development in national security strategy by placing the Administrator under the 
Secretary of State.212  This realignment also seeks to address the many coordination 
challenges facing foreign assistance programs.   
There are five geographic and three functional bureaus that assist the 
Administrator in executing his/her responsibilities.  Geographic bureaus are responsible 
for programs administered in specific regions or countries while functional bureaus 
oversee those programs that are global or merge across regional boundaries.  
Additionally, there are nine offices that perform more specific programs or directives 
such equal opportunity requirements.213   
Both geographic and functional bureaus play a role in higher education initiatives.  
Organizationally, these initiatives are the responsibility of the Economic Growth, 
Agriculture and Trade (EGAT) bureau, which is further subdivided into eight offices 
including the Education office.  The Education office oversees all educational 
development, including USAIDs efforts to support the Millennium Development Goals.  
The education office oversees three teams, of which the “Higher Education and 
Workforce Team” (HEW) is responsible for the university partnership programs.214  
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Geographic or regional bureaus have staffs that oversee functional issues within a 
region.  For example, the former Africa bureau had an office of Sustainable 
Development, which had an Education Division.  This division would serve as a 
regionally based advocate for higher education activities in the region.  Within many 
embassies there is a USAID “mission” that provides on-site support for development 
activities.  Missions are structured into four different models, but are designed to meet the 
needs of individual countries.215 
2. Higher Education Development (HED) 
Understanding the basic elements of USAID contracting policy is important to 
understand HEDs structure, purpose and mission.  In the 1990s, when the academic 
associations and USAID proposed establishing working relationships, USAID was 
cutting back on full-time staff and was unable to administer a growing mission. 216  
Federal law and USAID policy allow for goods and services to be contracted out to 
nonfederal entities when assistance is required, so they pursued an NGO service contract. 
In line with Federal Acquisition Regulations, which govern U.S. contract policy, 
any competitively-based government contracts must be transparent and fair.  These 
standards are in place to preserve the integrity of the contracting process.217 
USAID policy requires that the applicable USAID bureau manage and allocate 
funds to support USAID objectives.218  The Bureau, which is EGAT, works with the 
appropriate contracting official to determine how to best execute the desired outcome.  In 
this case, the HEW team did not have the necessary staff to execute the desired mission 
so they sought to “transfer money . . . to the recipient in order to carry out a public 
purpose . . . authorized by Federal statute.” 219   
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Based on the circumstances, this resource transfer could be accomplished through 
a grant or cooperative agreement.  USAIDs role determined the appropriate delivery 
method.  If the agency was to be “substantially involved” then a “cooperative agreement” 
was the right approach, if not, then money would be transferred to the recipient through a 
grant.220  Because USAID provided both geographic and functional expertise on 
economic development, a significant role was desired.  For that reason a cooperative 
agreement established the partnership.   
Executing this legal agreement posed additional challenges.  Due to contract laws, 
overarching objectives and mutually desired outcomes, delivery was not as simple as 
providing money to the academic associations and subsequently to individual institutions.  
As these requirements were considered, HED became the operational element for the 
cooperative agreement.   
3. Contract Laws 
Federal contracting standards are largely concerned with maintaining systemic 
integrity through transparency and fairness during the entire award process.  Laws require 
that decision makers avoid conflicts of interest by ensuring that information and decision-
making activities are available for potential participants.  It was also important provide an 
independent and competitive process to prevent perceived favoritism.   
4. Overarching Objectives 
As USAID and the higher education community came together, they saw an 
opportunity to better interact for a common purpose.  By establishing a defined 
relationship that increased communication and leveraged resources from both parties, 
foreign economic development would benefit.  USAID provides development awareness, 
expertise and strategic focus while the academic community offers structure to problem-
solving, creative suggestions and possible solutions for oft-challenging problems.221 
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5. Desired Outcomes 
Both parties wanted to maximize education resources in a manner that would 
meet recipient objectives while remaining aligned to American interests.  They also 
wanted to establish “participatory processes” that would encourage program 
sustainability.222  As recipient countries were presented with solutions and initial 
resources to address core problems, it was hoped that they would develop a greater ability 
and desire to meet their development needs.  As problems are solved and discovered, 
American students and faculty can establish relationships, gain exposure to and 
experience with the problems facing developing countries.  These opportunities can serve 
to build and strengthen human and institutional capacity. 
C. THE PARTNERSHIP 
In light of the law, overarching objectives and desired outcomes, HED was 
constituted to provide four primary services: (1) bring higher education institutions 
together in partnerships focused on USAID development goals, (2) seek funding 
solutions for those partnerships, (3) provide a forum for discussion, and (4) produce 
publications that highlight these efforts.223  It accomplished this with a Board of 
Directors, an Advisory Council and a small staff located in Washington D.C. 
The Board of Directors consists of six senior assistants to each of the academic 
associations.  It is now led by a Senior Vice President of ACE whose membership 
currently provides the largest number of active partnerships.224  An advisory staff brings 
significant expertise on higher education and development issues to assist the directors in 
decision-making. 
The HED staff consists of twenty-five personnel who understand international 
development as well as higher education and USAID operations.  They are led by an 
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Executive Director, who oversees Administrative, Communications, Monitoring and 
Evaluation and Program staffs.225  This staff serves as a source for building relationships 
in the development community and provides information on how to establish higher 
education partnerships as well as how to apply for and receive funding through the 
competitive awards process.    
As the party responsible for maintaining transparency and objectivity in the 
funding process, the HED staff liaise with USAID missions, D.C. Bureaus and the higher 
education community.  The process begins with requirements established by a host-
country institution and the applicable USAID mission.  They work with the HED staff to 
create a “Request for Application” (RFA), which communicates the desired outcome.  
The appropriate Bureau approves and HED forwards the RFA to the associations who 
market to potential U.S. partners.  Approximately three months later, four neutral higher 
education peers and an individual from the mission review, score and recommend a 
winner.226  Since 1998, HED has established more than 350 institutional partnerships in 
more than 60 countries with nearly $80 million in program grants.227 
The process is designed to create sustainable partnerships by offering a small 
amount of money.  One of the core elements evaluated by the peer committee during the 
RFA review process is cost sharing.  It is a prerequisite to applying for any university 
partnership and is designed to illustrate commitment.  The winning grant, paid through 
EGAT funds, provides initial funding to start a working relationship focused on 
individual and institutional objectives.   
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D. TRAINING, INTERNSHIPS, EXCHANGES AND SCHOLARSHIPS 
PROGRAM IN MEXICO 
1. The Problem 
USAIDs strategic economic vision for Mexico was established with the joint 
Mexico-U.S. statement concerning the Partnership for Prosperity initiative.  This directed 
both countries to work toward reducing the economic gap between Mexico’s rich and 
poor and was viewed as an opportunity to strengthen NAFTA. 
The current security problems present additional strategic dimensions to the TIES 
program.  Although the economic prognosis in Mexico appears to be improving, there 
have been more than 28,000 deaths resulting from Mexico’s military engagements with 
drug cartels since late 2006.  The situation has resulted in a greater emphasis by USAID 
on strategic concerns.228     
2. The Solution 
TIES was designed as a bilateral assistance program between the United States 
and Mexico to pursue university partnerships between American and Mexican schools 
and to provide scholarships to U.S. community colleges for Mexico’s rural poor.  This 
overarching country to country program was to provide the motive and means to generate 
several partnerships.  The scholarship element of the program was administered by a 
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The higher education community saw this as an opportunity to use HEDs services 
to leverage both government and private sector resources.  It aimed to achieve three 
broad objectives:230 
 Align donor and recipient objectives 
 Build and strengthen institutional capacity 
 Build individual capacity 
a. Donor and Recipient Objectives 
Donor and recipient objectives are divided into eight program areas: 
Agriculture, Distance Learning, Economic Opportunity, Education, Entrepreneurship, 
Environment, Governance, and Health.231  Although the breakdown provides a general 
overview of partnership activities, it is not all inclusive nor are categories clearly defined.  
The Economic Opportunity and Entrepreneurship categories are not clearly 
distinguishable.  Both categories include microfinance and general business projects 
designed to increase free-market competitiveness.232  Categorical assignment is important 
from a donor strategic perspective and for accountability, but many projects have 
outcomes that overlap multiple categories.  For example, some partnerships are placed in 
the Agriculture category, but they also include aspects that could qualify for the 
Economic Opportunity, Entrepreneurship, and Environment objectives.   
b. Institutional Capacity 
HED evaluates institutional capacity by measuring how TIES partnerships 
strengthen each other and how they approach development goals.  Stronger educational 
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institutions result as they incorporate concepts into courses, improve teaching techniques, 
create research partnerships, publish articles or improve management processes.  
Development goal accomplishments are evaluated by looking at development impacts 
expected within the general program areas.  These goals are addressed primarily by 
building stronger relationships with governments, NGOs or businesses, community 
outreach and promotions.233  
HED also attempts to establish strong institutional commitment by using 
its “cost-share” approach.  Potential applicants are required to commit a portion of the 
projected costs, which not only leverages the program, but strengthens the commitment 
between education partners.  
c. Building Human Capacity 
Building human capacity focuses on ways that individuals are able to 
improve themselves or their community.  Measurement is based on the number of people 
trained in some capacity and the number of scholarships or exchanges that are provided.  
University partnerships build human capacity by working directly with like-minded 
institutions on local problems.  This promotes more accurate understanding of 
development needs and the creation of flexible solutions through direct faculty and 
student interactions.   
All program participants are reviewed and required to have USAID 
sponsored training as a prerequisite to acceptance.  Participants are filtered to identify law 
abiding citizens who desire to assist in Mexico’s development, speak sufficient English, 
and are in good health.  A commitment to return to Mexico is mandatory.  The training 
provides an overview of what is expected of each individual and of what participants 
should expect during their visit to the United States.234     
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E. EVALUATING PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
Thus far, there have been 74 university partnerships.  The majority have been 
labeled with a primary focus on environmental issues, followed by agriculture and 
economic opportunity.  As previously mentioned, this one dimensional measurement 
does not adequately capture all affected strategic objectives.  For example, a partnership 
between Western Illinois University and two Mexican institutions seeks to strengthen the 
ecotourism industry in Southern Mexico.  Although the activities focus on improving 
business and customer service skills, the partnership was labeled as an agricultural 
project due to its attachment to the rural indigenous population in Southern Mexico.235 
Another project attempted to combine animal waste and energy services to 
strengthen the livestock sector in northern Mexico.  In this case, the University of 
Georgia and three Mexican universities partnered to create joint training that would be 
presented to industry, government and academic participants who would seek to 
strengthen affected businesses.236  Although it was labeled as an environmental project, it 
could have easily been placed in the agriculture or economic opportunity areas.    
1. Recipient Objectives 
The recently created Job Opportunity for Business Start Up (JOBS) initiative that 
HED is pursuing for Tijuana is an example of how donor and recipient objectives seek to 
align.  The global JOBS initiative is a recent USAID effort to link business focused 
colleges and universities with students in developing countries.  The desired outcome is 
to “prepare graduates who have an entrepreneurial spirit” and to offer tools and 
relationships that will lead to higher levels of employment.237  As a city bordering San 
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Diego, Tijuana has economic and security significance to the United States.  Mexico is 
seeking to create employment opportunities for youth who often turn to drug trafficking 
because of limited options in other sectors.  The premise of this RFA is that 
entrepreneurial opportunities will create competition against illegal drugs.  Whether or 
not this will work remains to be seen.238 
This illustrates how the broader structure between USAID and the academic 
associations serves to protect recipient objectives.  Because its authority comes from the 
U.S. government, USAID remains focused on U.S. strategic objectives.  When 
overlapping situations occur it would be easy to make program or organizational 
adjustments that may not fully consider recipient desires and subsequent difficulties may 
arise.  Higher education institutions, on the other hand, do not have the same obligations 
and have more incentives to maintain focus on recipient objectives.  HED and associated 
universities, as the executors of USAID interests are able to keep relative alignment 
between donor and recipient objectives, but they have greater flexibility to maintain focus 
on recipient needs than USAID would. 
2. Stable Funding 
As of September 2008, there had been more than 28,000 people affected through 
one of the partnerships.  Of those, there were 935 scholarships, more than 900 university 
exchanges, and more than 350 internships and nearly 26,000 were nondegree training 
initiatives.239 
To accomplish this, HED has awarded just over $19 million while partners and 
other sponsors have provided $20 million.240  By leveraging funds, HED spends $678 for 
every participant instead of $1,393.  If the 2,185 scholarships, exchanges and internships 
are isolated from the shorter term training activities, USAID spends $8,695 instead of 
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$17,849.  The limited amount of specific cost data prevents an accurate assessment, but it 
highlights how the cost-share program leverages savings for the government. 
3. Self-Sustainable Development 
USAID understands the role that sustainability plays in effectively delivering 
assistance.  In its September 2010 “Strategy for Meeting Millennium Development 
Goals” the word “sustain” (or a form of it) was used 78 times in the 33 page document.  
For them, “sustainab[ility] means that the policies and programs . . . [are] fully owned by 
the people they were designed to help . . . [and] rooted in sound domestic institutions that 
can nurture and finance them over the long term.”241  In this sense, university 
partnerships aim to generate momentum to maintain relationships that will then produce 
results. 
Institutional relationships are at the core of USAID’s definition of sustainability.  
While strong institutions are important for a successful society, it is important to 
distinguish how public and private institutions generate resources.  The private sector 
generates revenues through trade while most governments and NGOs depend upon 
private sector revenues through taxes or donations.  Some organizations, such as Ford 
Foundation create investment revenue from an endowment originating from a private 
sector benefactor.  This illustrates how institutional resources ultimately sprout from the 
private sector. 
Strong institutional relationships increase the ability of governments and NGOs to 
“nurture” resource options.242  In short, partnerships that rely on government 
appropriations or donations strengthen the foreign assistance lobby through growing 
numbers of program advocates.  If left unchecked, these institutions can shift their focus 
toward self-preservation which, despite good intentions, can lead to an excess supply of 
goods or services and damage a developing country’s ability to meet pressing needs.   
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The executive level Partnership for Prosperity was established as an attempt to 
address the economic gap between rich and poor in Mexico.  With that in mind, 
strengthening private sector entrepreneurship should be at the core of TIES partnerships.  
Ignoring private sector sustainability risks a loss of focus and unmet objectives. 
Of the 74 TIES partnerships, 40 are either linked to the private sector or seek to 
create employment opportunities for Mexican citizens.243  Although not all partnerships 
directly strengthen entrepreneurs, several innovative approaches have been used to 
generate private sector sustainability.  The University of Texas at San Antonio partnered 
with Universidad Veracruzana to establish more than 100 Small Business Development 
Centers (SBDC) that offer a variety of services.  These include helping individuals create 
or improve businesses, employing others, and using the Internet to expand.  This 
partnership created a system of SBDC networking, provided Master’s degrees in 
business, followed by internships and sought ways to maintain the quality of the SBDCs.  
Additionally, workshops and exchanges were offered as part of community outreach 
efforts.244   
Dr. Sylvia Ortega argued that many Mexican students are not developing 
employable skills and that there needs to be ability, awareness and a shift to meet the 
needs of high demand career fields.245  To address this problem, Southern Methodist 
University (SMU) and the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores, Monterrey 
(ITESM) used TIES to enable and encourage Mexican students to meet “the shortage of 
qualified software engineer developers who can meet the information technology needs 
of Mexico.”  SMU sponsored a one-week workshop and established a distance learning 
graduate level program for ITESM faculty. 246   
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The 34 remaining partnerships do not emphasize private sector solutions.  Instead 
they seek to strengthen government or NGO partnerships, improve general health, or 
environmental concerns.  While each offers necessary public services and capacity, they 
do little to strengthen entrepreneurial skillsets.  Some researchers suggest that the best 
way to address health or environmental concerns is by creating opportunities to raise 
living standards.247  Individuals have personal incentives to provide for themselves and 
their families, while environment and health initiatives may not take on personal meaning 
until other basic needs are addressed.  For example, China’s recent economic 
advancement has led to public calls for improved environmental policies—something that 
previously impoverished citizens did not seem to care about.248       
While this suggests that USAID should continue its requirement that any project 
be locally sustainable, it also suggests that economic opportunity through the private 
sector should be the top priority.  As people prosper, they are more likely to demand 
progressive efforts to improve environment and health. 
4. Minimize Dependency 
The TIES partnerships had mixed results in this category.  The vast majority of 
environmental and health partnerships seek to strengthen public institutions.  A simple 
example was the University of Wisconsin-Madison collaboration with two Mexican 
universities to strengthen watershed management programs in local municipal 
governments.249  Partnerships such as these will be dependent on appropriations or 
donations if they choose to continue the project.   
Others have creatively combined entrepreneurial activities with environmental or 
health improvements.  One partnership aimed to increase rural incomes and living 
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standards through applied environmental research.  In this case, West Virginia University 
and the Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro used greenhouse technology to help farmers 
fill a market niche and improve their production capacity.  The program created two 
greenhouse technology degree programs, offered 30 scholarships and built several 
greenhouses in the area for applied research capacity.250 
F. U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter evaluates whether TIES provides a service that fits within the 
parameters required for foreign assistance success.  HED was designed to administer the 
cooperative agreement between USAID and the higher education associations.  This 
structure empowers the TIES foreign assistance program to maintain relative focus on 
recipient objectives that meet Mexico’s long-term development needs.   
One of the strengths of this program is the concept of stable funding.  It has met 
the low-cost requirement by averaging $3.8 million per year in USAID allocations.  
Additionally, other participants have shown financial commitment with an additional $4 
million each year through cost-sharing.   
Applicants are required to plan for sustainability, but there is significant leeway in 
how a partnership delivers it.  Some partnerships plan private sector involvement while 
others strive to involve public institutions, which potentially create increased demand for 
future appropriations.  The larger concern is that institutional saturation may exacerbate 
the rich-poor gap and remove incentives that local entrepreneurs could solve.   
In large part, TIES partnerships use creative strategies to generate private sector 
sustainability.  These have created employment opportunities, raised production capacity 
and increased environmentally friendly technologies.  Despite Mexico’s current security 
challenges the TIES program offers solutions that generally provide institutions and 
individuals greater economic capacity. (See Summary at Figure 2) 
 
                                                 







o Partnership for Prosperity initiative to reduce economic gap between 
Mexico’s rich and poor 
 Build human capacity 
 Strengthen institutional capacity 
 Support USAID strategic goals in Mexico 
 
Organizational Structure: 
o HED serves as buffer between USAID and U.S. higher education 




 Recipient Objectives: 
o As third party, HED protects recipient and donor interests 
o Enables donor and recipient planning environment   
 
Stable Funding: 
o Low-cost: $3.8 million per year 
o Cost-share: partners provide additional $4 million each year 
 
Sustainability through the Private Sector: 
o Mixed results: 40 of 74 partnerships seek private sector involvement 
 
Minimal Dependency: 
o Mixed results: Health and Environmental partnerships tend to build 
capacity through institutional relationships 
 
U.S. Policy Implications: 
o HED model protects donor and recipient interest 
o Cost-sharing increases incentives for program success and 
sustainability 
o Blend of private and public capacity encourages sustainability 
 





VI. LDS PEF: PRIVATE RELIGIOUS ASSISTANCE 
The Perpetual Education Fund (PEF) was created by the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints (LDS or Mormon) to increase the economic capacity of its members in 
developing nations.  To understand this program it is necessary to examine the history of 
church expansion to the western United States, its focus on community building and how 
volunteers, organization and resources enabled the PEF to become a reality.  
A. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
The LDS church is a Christian denomination founded during the Second Great 
Awakening in New York by Joseph Smith.251  Early in the church’s history, new converts 
gathered in regions where they could support each other spiritually and economically.  As 
membership grew, differences with nonMormon neighbors led to political difficulties, 
tensions and crimes against many Mormons.  As a result, the main body of members 
moved from Ohio to Missouri to Illinois.  After Joseph Smith was killed by an Illinois 
mob in 1844, Latter-day Saints attempted to remain in western Illinois but tensions 
increased.  By the fall of 1845, Congressman Stephen Douglas and others were 
successful in convincing Brigham Young to lead the Latter-day Saints west as part of 
American manifest destiny.252   
1. Westward Trek–The Perpetual Emigration Fund   
The concept of the modern PEF is traced to the 1840s when Mormon pioneers 
were establishing Salt Lake City.  The vast majority of new converts during that time 
were extremely poor, but they desired to join the larger body of members in the west.  In 
order to meet the desires of these new members, LDS leadership created the Perpetual 
Emigration Fund, which was initially financed by the church to provide loans to  
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emigrants.  As they arrived and settled, they were expected to repay the loan thereby 
sustaining the revenues and create a “perpetual” revolving fund to maintain the 
emigration efforts.253   
The fund assisted nearly thirty thousand emigrants between 1849 and 1887.  In 
1880, LDS President John Taylor absolved many of the obligations owed by the poorest 
participants.254  In the end, around 65 percent of participants repaid all or part of their 
obligations, in part due to the dire economic conditions, the church’s continued emphasis 
on expansion and tensions with the U.S. government.255  The Edmunds-Tucker Act in 
1887 authorized the U.S. government to confiscate church assets due to its practice of 
polygamy.  At this time, the fund was disintegrated with around $435,000.  Although the 
money was returned in 1894, emigration to Utah had slowed and the emigration fund was 
no longer used.256   
Participants in this program played important roles in strengthening the church 
and establishing the economic foundation for subsequent generations.  Although many of 
them were extremely poor, they brought skills and an industrial mindset, which helped to 
establish Utah’s economy.  The beehive began to symbolize their emphasis on industry 
and its role in personal and societal development.  In fact, Utah was originally named the 
“land of Deseret” (honey bee) to remind settlers of their pioneer heritage and their core 
value of industriousness.257 
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2. LDS Community Building 
A core tenet of LDS doctrine is that Latter-day Saints are to build “Zion” in 
preparation for the second return of Jesus Christ.258  The term “Zion” embodies the ideal 
utopian community for LDS church members and is the desired outcome of their efforts.  
Efforts to build communities of Zion were a source of conflict during the early years of 
the church and led to misunderstandings with nonMormon neighbors.  As these neighbors 
became increasingly violent in the 1830s and 1840s, Mormons decided to establish their 
ideal community in the west.   
At the center of LDS community building is the “gathering” of new converts, 
which occurs both spiritually and physically.  People who join the LDS church are 
spiritually gathered into the church and are expected to participate in the cause of 
building Zion.259  Historically, Mormon converts would migrate significant distances to 
physically “gather” with other Latter-day Saints.   
Flourishing communities have been an essential element of the gathering process.  
As Mormons entered the Salt Lake Valley, the majority remained to build Salt Lake City, 
but Brigham Young directed others to further expand throughout much of the west.  As a 
result, several Mormon settlements were built in what are now Alberta, Canada, Arizona, 
Idaho, Mexico, Nevada, and Utah.260   
To encourage collective prosperity, LDS leaders have been proponents of an 
economic system known as the United Order.  This system is based on the following 
principles: “caring for the poor, work and self-reliance, equality, consecration, 
stewardship, the storehouse, and a moral motivation.”261  It is a community-based  
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endeavor that attempts to take advantage of many free market principles while mitigating 
risks through individual dedication, accountability and group property rights.   
Until 1893 there were many attempts to establish United Order communities that 
sought to balance individual and group rights.  Although there were some successes, the 
vast majority failed for a variety of reasons including unclear operational parameters, 
internal disagreements, legal issues with the federal government over polygamy and 
uncertainty about how to handle new members.262  Although United Order communities 
were discontinued, leaders continued to emphasize the importance of working toward Zion.   
As the church expanded, leaders encouraged individual adaptation of United 
Order principles.  Current LDS leaders teach that the physical gathering is not meant to 
establish large and exclusive Mormon communities.  “Every nation is the gathering place 
for its own people.  The place of gathering for Brazilian Saints is in Brazil; the place of 
gathering for Nigerian Saints is in Nigeria.”263  Mormons are asked to provide stability 
where they live.  While this entails seeking new converts and assisting current members, 
it is designed to be a process that includes and strengthens local communities as much as 
possible. 
In line with Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, Mormons set out to build stable and 
prosperous communities so that members could find fulfillment beyond physical 
satisfaction.  In 1905, the church President said, “It has always been a cardinal teaching 
with the Latter-day Saints, that a religion which has not the power to save people 
temporally and make them prosperous and happy here, cannot be depended upon to save 
them spiritually.”264 
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B. ENABLERS OF THE PERPETUAL EDUCATION FUND 
LDS history and beliefs toward community building provide partial insight into 
why Mormons have a strong conviction to the goal of assisting with global economic 
development efforts.  Conviction with capacity is essential to any successful development 
effort.  In this case the LDS church has three assets that have enabled the program.  These 
include: volunteers, organized leadership structure and a variety of resources.    
1. Volunteers 
Endogenous economic development does not take place in a vacuum.  One of the 
Mormon church’s “Articles of Faith” states that “We believe in being subject to kings, 
presidents, rulers and magistrates, in obeying, honoring and sustaining the law.”265  Like 
many other churches, the LDS church attempts to work within established systems of 
government and its efforts serve to strengthen existing institutional capacity by 
developing productive citizens. 
Volunteers are the primary tool that the church uses to assist governments with 
capacity.  Member participation in some role is highly encouraged, but the top priority for 
all members is to care for their families, which are considered the “most basic unit of 
society.”266  The family first approach aims to expand individual capacity to serve in a 
variety of roles.  Although most volunteer hours directly benefit the church and its 
members, Mormons are encouraged to “engage in a good cause.”267   
Local congregations often unite in conducting service activities in large or small 
groups.  Common activities are home repairs or yard clean up for the elderly, visiting 
nursing homes or hospitals, cleaning roads and parks and assisting with food drives for 
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the homeless or less fortunate.  Children, teenagers and young adults engage in service 
opportunities on a regular basis with their families and church groups.268  Following 
natural disasters or emergencies, the church often has thousands of willing volunteers to 
assist with clean up and basic repairs.  For example, during the three weeks following 
hurricane Katrina more than 8,000 Mormons from nearby states provided nearly 140,000 
man-hours to assist with clean up and house repairs.269  
2. Church Organization 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints claims to model its organization 
after the pattern established in the New Testament.270  The hierarchy consists of lay 
leaders from diverse backgrounds including business, law, academia, medicine, and 
public service among other specialties.  They are asked to serve the church as “General 
Authorities” in a variety of roles and capacities and participate in the decision-making 
processes.  This process involves the following governing bodies: the “First Presidency,” 
the “Council of the Twelve Apostles,” the “Quorums of the Seventy,” and the “Presiding 
Bishopric.”271 
a. Church Headquarters–General and Area Authorities 
The first governing unit, known as the “First Presidency,” is led by the 
church President (also known by members as the “Prophet”), and two Counselors who 
assist the President in his responsibilities.  The President has executive responsibility 
over all church affairs and policies.272  The Council of the Twelve Apostles is the next 
                                                 
268 Maribeth Christensen, “Volunteerism.” In Encyclopedia of Mormonism, (New York: Macmillan, 
1992), 1539. 
269 “Ramping Up for Rita and Cleaning Up from Katrina,” Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, http://beta-newsroom.lds.org/article/ramping-up-for-rita-and-cleaning-up-from-katrina (accessed 
12/4/2010).  
270 “Article of Faith 6,” Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
http://scriptures.lds.org/en/a_of_f/1 (accessed 12/4/2010). 
271 Marvin K. Gardner, “General Authorities.” In Encyclopedia of Mormonism, (New York: 
Macmillan, 1992), 538.  
272 J. Lynn England and W. Keith Warner, “First Presidency.” In Encyclopedia of Mormonism, (New 




highest ranking unit and serves to assist the First Presidency by overseeing global church 
expansion and stability.273  These two bodies meet together weekly to coordinate, provide 
assignment and make decisions pertaining to the church.274 
“Quorums of Seventies” help administer the decisions made by the First 
Presidency and the Council of the Twelve Apostles.  As of October 2010, there were 
eight quorums with three hundred Seventies.  The first two quorums along with seven 
Presidents are General Authorities and primarily live in Salt Lake City and oversee one of 
the twenty-six “Areas” of the church.275  The remaining six quorums live in their local 
regions and are called “Area Seventies.”276  Leadership in the twenty-six Areas oversees 
and assists local leaders. 
Church leaders are also given access to additional resources that assist 
members and others during humanitarian emergencies or personal challenges.  These 
resources are ultimately overseen by the “Presiding Bishopric,” which consists of three 
General Authorities responsible for physical operations of the church.  These have been 
dedicated church leaders who have proven business and management abilities.  They 
oversee how donations are received and expended, how worship facilities are created, 
built and maintained, and how membership records are accounted.  Additionally, they 
oversee the operational elements and full-time staff of LDS welfare and humanitarian 
services.277     
In addition to the previously mentioned resources available to General 
Authorities, there are five “auxiliary organizations” that offer support for more specific 
aspects of the church mission and serve as committee members in a variety of functions.  
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The Church Education System (CES) is one such organization and focuses on the 
educational needs of church members.  The church also has more than 50,000 full-time 
missionary volunteers supporting over 28,200 congregations to find and support new 
converts.278  These organizations are located in Salt Lake City and are supported by a 
salaried headquarters staff that assists the General Authorities, auxiliaries, areas, 
missions, and CES leaders in many capacities.    
b.  Local Structure-Stakes and Wards 
Local operations are conducted at two separate levels–the “Stake” and the 
“Ward.”  Between five and twelve wards or approximately 3,000 members constitute a 
stake.279  The term and concept of a stake is established in the Old Testament book of 
Isaiah.  In this book, a reference is made to using “stakes” to secure a tent.  The analogy 
is that the entire church (the tent) is only as strong as the more locally focused stakes.   
In many respects, the organization of stakes is patterned after the higher 
levels of the church.  They are led by a President, two counselors, and twelve additional 
men who assist the President in coordination and decision-making.  Additionally, there 
are other leaders who perform specific support functions related to the physical and 
spiritual well-being of local members.280 
Local Mormon congregations (“wards”) are comprised of between 300 
and 600 people in a variety of geographic areas and are led by a “Bishop.” 281  Among 
other things Bishops are tasked to “seek out the poor and needy” in order to assist and 
strengthen them.282  In order to assist the bishop with his responsibilities, wards are 
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subdivided to ensure that each family or individual is integrated into the organization.  
Essentially, the ward organization is designed to increase social interaction, 
accountability and service between members. 283  As these interactions take place it 
enhances the collective stability of the unit and provides a forum where needs can be 
identified and addressed.   
3. Access to Resources 
The church is an organization designed to assist members in meeting both 
physical and spiritual needs.  This structure enables church leaders to maintain doctrinal 
consistency and provide assistance when necessary to meet family and regional needs.  It 
enables constant interaction and mentoring from the most senior to very junior leaders.  
Additionally, the church relies on the volunteer efforts of its members in a variety of 
areas and everyone is given the opportunity to teach or serve in some capacity.  When 
members are not economically self-sufficient, they are unable to effectively contribute 
their time or resources.  As an organization, the church is dependent upon volunteer 
leadership and support, therefore it focuses its resources on enabling its volunteers. 
With a clear leadership chain and access to resources, the church is able to assess 
needs on individual and regional levels and quickly respond.  Leadership at all levels is 
trained to leverage available resources to serve the needs of current members and 
community members when possible.  
4. LDS Welfare Services 
The modern LDS welfare system began during the Great Depression in the 1930s.  
During that time, there was a dichotomy in the economic abilities of urban and rural 
members.  Farmers were able to provide for their physical needs, but due to extremely 
low market prices, there were no incentives to harvest.  Stake presidents arranged for  
 
 
                                                 




members living in urban areas to provide free labor to these farmers in exchange for a 
share of the crops.  The church was offered the remaining harvest to place in storage 
facilities that enabled more central locations for distribution.284   
During the past 75 years, the LDS welfare program expanded as the church 
purchased several “welfare” farms and associated infrastructure to produce, process and 
distribute basic food commodities.285  This agricultural capacity provides employment for 
a small number of people, service opportunities for general church membership and life 
sustaining resources for those struggling economically.  Church members donated 
763,737 man days to these operations in 2009.286 
5. LDS Employment Services 
Other resources are available to the unemployed, those seeking to improve their 
skillsets or simply change jobs.  Employment assistance has been expanded to include 
more than 320 employment resource centers that offer employment counseling, 
mentoring, training, and placement services.  Many of these are administered by retired 
church members who choose to serve as full-time volunteers.   
In 2009, the church helped more than 103,000 individuals find jobs or training 
opportunities to enhance capacity.287  Additionally, a thrift store established by the church 
in 1938, has grown to forty-six stores in Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, 
Utah and Washington.  These serve to provide employment opportunities and training, 
along with clothing and other supplies to those in need.288   
These resources are available for Bishops to assist people in need.  For example, a 
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mother or father may have lost a job and is in need of assistance.  The Bishop or his 
authorized representative will assess the family resource capacity and needs.  By 
providing groceries along with other items, the family can allocate resources for other 
needs like rent or mortgage payments.  Also, the family can use LDS employment 
services to acquire additional training or as a network to find possible opportunities.  In 
the end, families maintain dignity, minimize stress and increase loyalty to the church. 
6. LDS Education Services         
Church leaders have emphasized the importance of education for personal and 
community development since the inception of the church.  For Mormons, education not 
only serves as an investment in their future, it provides variety to life.  In 1971, the 
Commissioner of Church Education said, “education is not only the key to the individual 
member’s economic future, but also to his opportunities for self-realization.”289 
Latter-day Saints founded the University of the City of Nauvoo in 1841 offering a 
variety of languages along with math, literature, sciences and history.  Despite the 
extreme hardships faced during their westward trek later in the decade, they were 
encouraged to bring “every historical, mathematical, philosophical, geographical, 
geological, astronomical, scientific, practical and interesting writings, maps, etc.” 290   
Education continued to be a priority as Mormons settled in the western U.S.  
Several educational establishments were created in the late 19th century, but many failed 
due to high operating costs relative to the growing supply of public education.291  The 
most prominent and successful higher education establishments include the University of 
Deseret (later University of Utah) in 1850,292 Brigham Young Academy (later Brigham 
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Young University) in 1875,293 the Salt Lake Stake Academy (later LDS Business  
College) in 1886,294 the Bannock Stake Academy (later Ricks College, then Brigham 
Young University-Idaho) in 1888,295 and the Church College of Hawaii (later Brigham 
Young University-Hawaii) in 1955.296   
The 1887 Edmunds-Tucker Act and increasing numbers of nonMormons moving 
into Utah created a demand to remove religious education from public schools.  In 
response, the church created the Church Education System (CES) to provide religious 
education to its members.  CES is divided into three areas: First, “Seminary” provides 
religious education to high school students.  Second, “Institute” offers a higher level of 
religious study for university and college aged young adults.  Third, CES oversees the 
four church owned colleges/universities.297 CES is overseen by a Board of Education 
consisting of the First Presidency and other high level General Authorities and auxiliary 
members.298 
For development purposes, the LDS Institute of Religion provides the church with 
access to nearly 360,000 college age students at almost 2,600 postgraduate institutions.  
Full and part-time directors and teachers provide religious education, counsel, and 
otherwise interact with these students on a regular basis. 299 It is through these networks 
that the church evaluates the needs of its young members seeking to improve their 
economic position. 
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C. PERPETUAL EDUCATION FUND 
As the church became increasingly global it discovered additional development 
challenges.  When the Perpetual Emigration Fund ended in 1887, there were around 
180,000 Mormons, of which the vast majority lived in Utah.  By 1996, the church had 
more than 9 million members, and more than half resided outside of the United States.300  
By this time there was a strong base of middle class members, and increasing 
membership coming from developing countries. 
1. Problem of Development in 2001 
As the church grew in the mid-1990s, economic disparity between the rich and 
poor became more pronounced in many developing countries.  During this time, a 
growing number of Latter-day Saints were able to access to higher education, but at the 
same time a significant number could not provide for basic necessities.  As young people 
from developing countries served two-year church missions, they often had a higher 
standard of living than while living at home.  When their period of service ended, they 
returned home to the same impoverished conditions they left and often experienced 
destitution and despair.301 
From an institutional perspective, the church directly benefits from self-sufficient 
members who have the capacity to provide for economic needs and are willing to 
contribute time and resources to strengthen the church.  Leaders sought to find ways to 
help members in developing countries without creating economic dependence upon the 
institution.  The challenge was to assist people in a way that would be economically 
sustainable.  Economic sustainability for the LDS church meant self-sufficiency or self-
reliance.  In other words, individuals are able to rely on their own skills, talents and 
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abilities to meet personal needs.  This does not mean that individuals do not rely on the 
church for any assistance.  In fact, individuals who accept assistance often become 
among the most generous contributors, but the church serves to fill gaps instead of 
providing a constant stream of welfare assistance.   
Many Mormons who are not self-sufficient still contribute in whatever way they 
can, but since the church relies on local leadership to conduct many of its operations it is 
vital to develop leadership skills.  In this case, the church began by focusing on assisting 
missionaries who returned from their missions.  These young people spend between 
eighteen and twenty-four months of full-time service to the church.  During this time, 
they develop leadership experience in how the church operates.  When they return home, 
they have developed abilities that could be utilized to make them more effective 
community leaders.  Some of these skills include public speaking (often in a foreign 
language), writing, management, general dependability and personal discipline.  They are 
often motivated individuals willing to sacrifice to improve themselves and others.  When 
they did not have the ability to sustain themselves, the church was unable to leverage 
their abilities for institutional strength. 
The church also considered the challenges as a generational problem.  When 
someone spends the majority of their time working to obtain food, clothing and shelter, 
there is little time to pursue self-actualization.  Those who have children may want them 
to have more opportunities, but it is easy for these children to carry on similar patterns 
and habits thereby passing poverty from generation to generation. 302   
Although Mormons are generally a small minority in developing countries, 
governments benefit in many ways.  Governments indirectly benefit as the church serves 
to buffer local economic challenges while encouraging activities that contribute to greater 
government stability.  When any individual is able to be self-sustaining, social expenses 
and demands are reduced.  As these individuals reach out to assist others, it accentuates 
desirable traits that strengthen stability. 
                                                 




The development challenge was to assist members seeking to improve their 
economic value.  For many, the opportunity costs for pursuing an education exceeded the 
potential return on investment.  This was especially true for a liberal arts education in 
developing countries.  Not only was there less access, but costs were generally higher.  
Credit was also generally unavailable or not affordable.   
A remaining challenge was how to practically and simply apply principles of self-
sustaining development.  Leaders did not want to create a program that would be 
excessively bureaucratic and cost prohibitive.  The program needed specific and 
achievable objectives that addressed the lack of skills facing many members in 
developing countries.  In their eyes, endogenous development through technical 
education was the most cost-effective means of helping members help themselves and to 
provide support to existing institutional capacity.   
2. Solution: The Perpetual Education Fund  
President Gordon Hinckley announced the establishment of the Perpetual 
Education Fund (PEF) in March 2001.  The fund was to be an endowment established by 
member donations that would be invested.  Investment earnings would be used to provide 
loans to members in developing countries to attend school, obtain employment, and pay 
back their loans.  Similar to the Perpetual Emigration Fund from the 1840s, these loans 
would serve to revolve in order to maximize the number of people who could benefit.303 
Potential students were expected to take advantage of opportunities in the regions 
they lived.  They would plug into the program through the local church Institute.  
Institute directors were to become increasingly familiar with educational opportunities in 
the area and would serve as advisors to students and bishops.304  LDS employment 
services were to be expanded to assist with training in such things as creating resumes, 
interviewing, and communicating.   
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3. PEF: Organization 
A retired General Authority was selected to serve as the Executive Director for 
the PEF, which was incorporated as a separate 503 nonprofit organization. 305  The staff 
initially consisted of the Executive Director, a Managing Director, a Director of 
Operations, an experienced consultant and an administrative assistant.306  As the program 
grew, two retired husband and wife teams along with an accounting clerk and financial 
controller were added to the full-time staff.307  No PEF donations are used to pay staff 
overhead expenditures.  Four of the eleven full-time staff members are paid employees, 
however, salaries and staff overhead are appropriated and supplemented through general 
church funds.308  
The executive director reports to a larger church Board of Directors that consists 
of the First Presidency, two members from the Council of the Twelve, the Presiding 
Bishop, the General Relief Society President (auxiliary support leader), the senior 
Seventy and head of the CES.309 
The established local church structure was in place to prepare and identify 
potential candidates.  Bishops and stake presidents were familiar with individual 
circumstances and served to push forward those with the lack of resources.  Institute 
directors interacted with young people during their religious studies and were trained to 
identify local educational opportunities.  
4. How PEF Works 
Following the initial announcement in March 2001, church leaders were 
overwhelmed with requests for information on the program.  The small staff had 
international business, finance, and legal experience along with operating nonprofit 
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organizations in Mongolia and other places.310  Because of high demand and the desire to 
begin the program quickly, the staff was directed to begin initial operations in Chile, Peru 
and Mexico because of the high proportion of returned missionaries in these countries 
who needed assistance.311 
The staff traveled to these countries to research available options and legalities.  
They visited banks, student loan companies, private NGOs and technical schools in order 
to examine development capacity.  These visits resulted in enhanced operating practices 
that were adapted into the program.  During these visits, the staff emphasized that PEF 
was not to compete with local capacity, but to enable its members the opportunity to 
participate in available programs.312 
5. Challenges 
Since institutes in developing countries were the primary executors of the new 
program their workload significantly increased.  As part of these increased 
responsibilities, directors and their staffs were to establish an increased awareness of 
local training and educational opportunities.313  To handle these additional 
responsibilities directors received training from the PEF headquarters staff and 
authorization to increase their volunteer staff.   Additionally, computers were provided 
along with specific software and Internet resources in areas they could be used.314   
As the PEF expanded in 2002 throughout all of Central America, South America 
and the Philippines the staff had to resolve various legal issues for each country.  They  
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struggled with how to operate a global loan program in individual countries.  To resolve 
these issues the church’s legal team coordinated with lawyers in each country to address 
specific legal requirements.315   
6. Funding and Financing 
Money contributed to the PEF is placed in a “corpus” managed by Ensign Peak 
Investments, the firm that manages many of the church’s investments.316  Each year, the 
PEF board of directors approves the amount to be allocated for loans, which is close to 
the anticipated amount the fund will earn in interest during the year.  Since administrative 
and overhead costs are supplemented by the church, the fund is designed to stay focused 
on desired outcomes. 
While the specific amount in the fund is not publicly released, the church has now 
likely met or exceeded its $250 million goal.317  To make donations easily accessible, the 
fund is included on the general donation form used by members to make contributions.  
The church highlights that hundreds of thousands of people have contributed to the fund, 
often expressing personal convictions about the program.  The church emphasizes to 
participants that PEF loans represent the best efforts of the collective membership.  In 
return, they are expected to give their best efforts to improve themselves and develop 
leadership skills that will benefit the church and their communities.  (See Figure 3.) 
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Figure 3.   Corpus Funding and Financing 
Participants who use the interest created by the fund are expected to pay it back 
within two to eight years.  After they have been in school for three months, they begin 
paying small amounts, which are applied to the principal balance.  Three months 
following graduation they make larger payments that include a 3% interest rate and 
applicable inflationary adjustments.  When personal catastrophe or other significant 
events occur, the church serves to assist with appropriate adjustments.318   
Although loan amounts vary based on individual circumstances, the average loan 
size is around $1,050.319  While most pursue training at vocational schools that can be 
completed in two years, the church authorizes up to four years for qualifying members.  
Current participants attend training for an average of 2.7 years.320   
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When available, the church sends the money to local banks or other institutions 
that directly pay schools and collect payments from participants.321  This outsourcing 
activity enables the church to maintain focus on effectively administering the program, 
while strengthening institutional capacity in a developing country.  Overall, the 
arrangement enhances the individual experience as they learn to work with financial 
institutions in managing debt, interest and credit.      
7. The Operations 
Leaders claim that PEF “does more than just provide a loan.”322  The program is 
marketed with five steps.  First, potential participants are to envision what they would 
like to achieve in life.  Second, they are taught how to plan toward the larger objective.  
Third, if assistance is required, they learn how to apply for financing from the church.  
Fourth, if the plan and loan is approved, they further solidify their plans and commitment 
to repay the loan.  Fifth, they execute the plan, find employment and repay the loan. 
a. Step One: Dream  
As a religious organization, the church seeks members to identify practical 
and spiritual commitment.  At a minimum, each stake hosts an outreach program called 
the “PEF Fireside.”  During this event, young people between 18 and 30 are encouraged 
to consider their futures and think about what they would like to become if given the 
opportunity.  This is an attempt to get young people in less developed countries to look 
beyond immediate physical demands and envision themselves in a self-actualized 
condition.  The program and its parameters are explained and those interested are 
encouraged to contact their leaders to pursue their options. 
b. Step Two: Plan and Qualify     
Potential applicants attend a more personally oriented “Planning for 
Success Workshop” that the local institute director conducts.  During this workshop, 
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individuals are assisted in conducting a thorough opportunity cost analysis so they can 
evaluate costs and options.  Participants are also encouraged to keep a positive attitude as 
they search for personal options, learn to recognize the skills they have already, take 
advantage of available choices and evaluate potential careers. As they examine careers, 
they are assisted with efforts to research current and projected market conditions, 
potential salaries, entry requirements, schools that provide necessary training and 
potential sources for funding.323   
After completing their research, participants evaluate and decide how to 
move forward.  Some young people discover options previously unknown to them and 
pursue their goals without church assistance.  Those who still need assistance are 
interviewed by their bishop and stake president to review their understanding of the 
program and their commitment to personal development, to the church and to paying 
back assistance after they receive it.  Additionally, it is made clear that participants will 
sacrifice during their studies.  This typically means that they will work part-time jobs and 
pay for their reasonable costs324 
c. Step Three: Apply 
Institute directors verify completion of the workshop and the viability of 
each individual’s plan.  Approved applicants are then provided computers and assistance 
to complete the local process and forward their information to a PEF loan committee in 
Salt Lake City.  The committee reviews the plan, verifies alignment with strategic goals 
and approves funding.   
d. Step Four: Commit 
Institute directors again meet with approved applicants to finalize the 
process.  This meeting requires future participants to bring the endorsement letter 
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completed by the bishop and stake president in step two, proof of attendance at religious 
studies classes provided by the institute, a completed employment, education and finance 
plan and an official statement from the vocational school stating the anticipated costs and 
any unique rules they may have. 
e. Step Five: Study, Graduate, Improve Work and Repay 
Most students complete their programs in less than two years, although 
some are authorized up to four.325  As the church researched how to best execute the PEF, 
they discovered from a student loan company in Chile that pay back rates increased 
significantly if participants began repaying very small portions of their loans while they 
were still students.326  For most students, the requirement is to pay $5 per month while in 
school with growing amounts a short-time after graduation and employment.   
Students continue to be supported by institute directors, local bishops and 
fellow members.  They are encouraged to pursue real-world employment opportunities 
such as apprenticeships when they are available.  As they near graduation, they attend a 
“Career Workshop” offered by LDS employment services to prepare for the demands of 
obtaining employment.  This activity helps them anticipate and prepare for employment 
opportunities by practicing interview skills, writing resumes, and building networks 
among colleagues.  With the increasing availability of computer and Internet technology 
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D. RESULTS AND OUTCOMES 
Although the church will miss its early predictions of 65,000 participants through 
2010, more than 42,000 members from 45 countries had participated as of December 
2009.328  Of those, 90 percent were meeting the terms of their obligations.329  As more 
participants graduate, payments continue to grow.  In 2009, nearly $2.5 million was paid 
by participants with more expected each year.330 It is desired that the amount repaid by 
graduating participants will equal the amount paid to participants entering the program 
thereby truly becoming revolving. 
Most participants report that earnings are three to four times the amount they were 
making before beginning their education.331  This is resulting in many reporting personal 
satisfaction and higher levels of self-actualization.  Due to program structure, participants 
gain knowledge and experience with credit, interest and budgeting.  Although these 
experiences are in a relatively controlled environment, they benefit individuals, families 
and communities.   
It also appears that the church is meeting its institutional objective of developing 
loyal and competent leaders.  As of the end of 2009, church reports from Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela show that more than 10 percent of bishops or stake presidents are 
PEF graduates.332  These leaders, who are expected to provide for their families and 
congregations, will serve as linchpins in eliminating the generational elements of poverty 
in the areas they serve.   
Areas with high levels of unemployment or no technical training capacity have 
unique challenges.  The church recognizes these circumstances and seeks to assist 
members by offering entrepreneurial training on how to begin and operate a small 
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business through church leadership.333  Although the same level of institutional support is 
not available, the church seeks to find creative solutions to assist these members.  It also 
believes that as development programs like PEF succeed, capacity will spread to more 
remote areas. 
E. EVALUATING PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Recipient Objectives 
The global reach of the LDS church gives it access to local volunteers.  Its 
organization enables communication from local communities to higher representatives 
with access to resources.  In this way, donors and recipients are unified and have 
common interests and manage concerns locally. 
2. Stable Funding 
Although the amount of the endowment is relatively high, it is designed so that 
investment interest pays for all educational expenses while the church pays for PEF 
administrative costs through other sources.  Costs are shared by individuals who are 
required to pay as much as possible.   
3. Self-Sustainable Development 
The organization evaluates local needs through the educational system then 
provides personalized counseling to help individuals prepare for high-demand 
opportunities.  Individuals who live in areas with few employment opportunities are 
provided encouragement and self-employment training.  
The PEF concept is similar to a micro-financing program that provides assistance 
to potential entrepreneurs who are enabled to supply a market demand.  The PEF 
approach is a whole-person endogenous effort that, in general, strengthens existing 
market capacity.  New students create demands for existing vocational schools and local 
 
                                                 




financial institutions.  By encouraging self-employment where capacity is weak and by 
enhancing productivity in countries with even minimal capacity, the program encourages 
a sustainable free market.   
Additionally, the program supports existing private and public institutions, 
thereby providing another layer of sustainability.  As community relationships are 
strengthened additional channels of support are created.  These relationships include 
existing government and NGOs that may rely on appropriations or donations.  Strong 
support from public institutions combined with economically sustainable private 
institutions provides an ideal combination for sustainability.     
4. Minimize Dependency 
Free market economies benefiting from this program would not be dependent 
upon U.S. government appropriations or donations to NGOs for continued sustainability.  
Upfront appropriations would be required, but if they were later removed, recipient 
economic objectives could still be attained.   
F. U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The LDS church has taken a sustainable free market concept and used its 
available structure and resources to apply a practical solution.  They are able to control 
the majority of their costs by utilizing volunteers who are committed and organized.  The 
greatest challenge for a government or NGO to duplicate the PEF concept would be how 
to generate local community support without losing the principles of self-sustainability.  
As a religious organization, the LDS church has access to millions of loyal and 
committed members who are willing to contribute money, time and expertise to assist 
programs such as the PEF.  These volunteers attempt to address the whole-person 
concepts of self-sufficiency and self-actualization and to strengthen communities with 
their efforts.  Any application to a nonreligious environment would need a strong plan 
and willing participants to appropriately motivate and train a volunteer staff to execute 




This program serves as a possible pattern for how communities can increase 
wages and reduce the rich-poor gap facing many developing countries.  In order to 
achieve success, any government program will require: (1) a well-managed upfront 
investment, (2) a plan to replenish expenses and keep costs relatively low, and (3) a 
competent organization that understands and brings together the local employment 







o Enable potential church leaders improved employment opportunities 
 
Organizational Structure: 




 Recipient Objectives: 
o Common church membership provides motivation to remain focused 
on recipient needs 
o Institute directors and local leaders mentor young people to evaluate 
opportunity costs and establish individualized improvement plan 
 
Stable Funding: 
o Annual interest from $250 million endowment pays for annual loans 
o Cost-share: Loans are repaid by participants ($2 million repaid in 
2009) 
o See Figure 3 
 
Sustainability through the Private Sector: 
o Local leaders trained to evaluate local employment market and 
training opportunities 




o Initial investment that becomes revolving minimizes potential for 
dependency 
o Religious organization utilizes numerous convicted volunteers 
 
U.S. Policy Implications: 
o Initial endowment and short-term appropriations to establish program 
o Biggest challenge would be minimizing costs with volunteers 
  









United States foreign assistance has been fraught with inconsistency since its 
inception.  As a modern tool of national security it was designed to strengthen 
international relationships and build trust with U.S. partners.  One of the great challenges 
in delivering effective foreign assistance is objective alignment—donors giving 
according to their national interests and recipients receiving according to their interests. 
Maintaining alignment has presented a historical challenge.  First, as U.S. security 
interests have changed, foreign assistance priorities have changed.  Second, the principal-
agent problem remains—political leaders are accountable to the American people so 
unless the people become convinced that long-term humanitarian objectives support 
American interests, there will be challenges.  Third, budgets rise and fall due to numerous 
factors and, due to the principal-agent problem, budget items focused on foreign 
assistance will face political scrutiny.  
In order to maintain focus on strengthening international relationships, strategic 
aid planners can improve operational effectiveness by focusing on the following four 
planning considerations: (1) maintaining focus on recipient objectives, (2) stable funding, 
(3) self-sustenance, and (4) minimizing dependency on U.S. appropriations or NGO 
donations. 
This paper narrowed its analysis to three higher education foreign assistance 
cases.  Each provides scholarships, loans or grants to individuals or institutions in 
developing countries.  A variety of institutional perspectives have been selected.  The 
Ford Foundation’s International Fellowship Program is a socially oriented nonreligious 
NGO, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Perpetual Education Fund is a 






A.  RECIPIENT OBJECTIVES 
Ford Foundation and the LDS church have organizational structures and missions 
designed exclusively to meet recipient objectives.  To execute local operations, Ford 
Foundation used its vast network of NGO partnerships while the LDS church used 
existing membership and local lay leaders.  Both were aggressive in preparing individuals 
for their educational experience.  Ford offered individualized counseling and training to 
prepare individuals for their fellowship experience.  At the same time, they worked with 
higher education partners to lower entrance requirements and provide assistance 
throughout the fellowship.  The LDS church helped individuals evaluate opportunity 
costs, goals, and local employment markets.  They then crafted plans to help individuals 
succeed in their plans. 
The USAID-HED TIES partnership with higher education associations sought to 
align American strategic objectives with Mexican objectives.  Specifically, the TIES 
initiative sought to reduce the economic gap in Mexico.  American colleges and 
universities partnered with Mexican institutions to achieve desired recipient outcomes.  
As a third party, HED managed the process of assisting recipients within USAID 
requirements.   
B.  STABLE FUNDING 
1. Low Costs 
Ford Foundation committed $405 million to assist 4,300 projected participants.  
This amounts to approximately $31 million per year or $93,000 for each participant.  
From an appropriations perspective, a $31 million annual commitment seems reasonable, 
however policy makers would need to evaluate the per person costs.334   
The LDS church established a $250 million endowment that seeks to use annual 
 
 
                                                 




interest to assist an increasing number of participants.  Thus far, more than 42,000 
participants have benefitted from the program.  Average loans have amounted to around 
$1,050.335 
HED has awarded around $19 million to support 74 TIES partnerships.  As of 
September 2008, more than 28,000 people have benefitted from training.336  Of these, 
there have been nearly 2,200 scholarships, exchanges or internships. 
2. Cost-Sharing 
The IFP has no cost-sharing program, while the PEF uses an institution to 
individual cost-share approach.  LDS participants pay for as many costs as possible 
during their training, followed by complete loan repayment.  The TIES program utilizes 
an institutional approach in which institutions pay for a portion of the program.  Thus far, 
TIES partners have paid slightly over $20 million.337   
C. SELF-SUSTENANCE 
Ford Foundation defines sustainability in terms of IFP graduates.  These graduates 
are expected to return to their communities and apply lessons from their fellowship 
experiences.  This approach has and will continue to benefit many communities, but IFP 
as a fellowship program will end in 2013.  Although IFP was not designed to be self-
sustaining, any future efforts may consider using an endowment to extend additional 
opportunities to targeted individuals. 
The PEF uses its revolving fund to continue operations indefinitely.  As long as 
the fund is well managed and participants repay their loans, the program will continue to 
benefit as many participants as desired. 
Sustainability for USAID has broad meaning and TIES applicants define the 
parameters for each partnership.  In general, public sector initiatives sought to be 
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sustainable by establishing institutional relationships.  As institutions like universities or 
NGOs become involved in a project they will be more likely to invest their resources.  
Sustainability through private sector initiatives seeks free market solutions that will 
continue to generate necessary resources.  As a result of these parameters, TIES 
partnerships had mixed results in creating self-sustainable programs.  A variety of 
creative approaches used free market principles to enable private sector opportunities.   
D.  MINIMIZE DEPENDENCY 
The IFP is entirely dependent upon Ford Foundation resources for execution.  
Although the program was designed to operate for a specific amount of time based on a 
large donation, other approaches are possible for future endeavors. 
The PEF is not dependent on external long-term donations for continued 
operation.  An initial donation is required, but the revolving fund design enables the 
program to continue for as long as recipients are willing to repay. 
The TIES program has mixed results.  Those programs that engage entrepreneurs 
and the private sector will have little need for continued appropriations.  Those aimed at 
assisting public sector capacity without a plan for self-sustainability will require 
continued appropriations. 
E. CLOSING STATEMENT 
Each program offers lessons that can be applied in a variety of foreign assistance 
efforts.  Overall, initial program design sets the stage for success, but U.S. planners need 
to be aware of the external factors affecting foreign assistance programs.  Ultimately, 
government organizations are accountable to the American people, therefore, the 
principal-agent problem applies and budgets will shift.  If foreign assistance is designed 
to build trust with international allies, then it is imperative to focus on their needs.  
Planners can assist by creating programs that address the four previously mentioned 
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